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Abortion Across State Lines 
Joseph W. Dellapenna* 
In the span of about a year in the mid- I 990s, news media fea-
tured two stories about adolescent girls and abortion. In examining 
the somewhat sensationalized accounts of the 1:\vo stories, one realiz-
es that each could have been presented very diHcrently. The tlrst, 
from Nebraska, tells of a community strongly opposed to abortion 
that gathered together to prevent an unmarried pregnant teenager 
from having an abortion. 1 According to the New York Times, the fa-
ther's family conspired with a doctor, the local sheriH"s office and lo-
cal police, the County Attorney, and the local Juvenile Court judge 
to deprive the girl and her family of their freedom to choose abor-
tion by kidnapping the girl pursuant to a court order. 2 One could as 
easily cast the conspirators as heroes tlghting to protect the rights of 
both the unborn child and its father by intervening to save the life of 
an unborn child in the 1:\Vcnty-third week of gestation-now an in-
fant girl described in a quotation in the New York Times as a "darling 
little baby" being raised by the parents of the unnamed teenage girl. 3 
Pennsylvania provides a contrasting story, with the interveners on 
the side of "choice" rather than "life." In northeastern Pennsylvania, 
Rosa Marie Hartford was convicted of interfering with the custody of 
a thirteen-year-old girl by taking her to New York for an abortion 
without the knowledge or consent of the girl's mother, who did not 
even know that the girl was pregnant.4 While Hartford claimed that 
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.B.A., Univ. of Mich. 
(1<.165); J.D., Detroit College of Law (1<.168); LL.M. in International and Comparative Law, 
George Washington Llniv. (I <.16<.1); LL.M. (in Etwironmental Law), Columbia Univ. (I <.174); 
author ofDISl'ELU:-.:c; THE MYTHS OF ABORTIO:--l HISTORY (2006). 
I. Tamar Lewin, Nebraska Abortion Case: The Issue is Interference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2S, I <.1<.15, at AS. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Marie McCullough, Woman Convicted Who Aided Abortion: She 1iJok Her Son's 13-
Ymr-Old Girlji·iend to Nnv Yorli State fin· the Procedure Without Parental Consent, !'HILA. 
1:-.:<._!UIR~.IZ, Oct. 30, 1<.1<.16, at AI [hcreinati:er McCullough, Woman CmtJJictcdj; David Stout, 
Woman Who "J(}()k Girlfiw Abortion Is Guilty in Custody Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, I <.1<.16, at 
Al5; st'f also Marie McCullough, Abortion Case 1irps Some of Parents' /)eepest Fmr.r, I'HILA. 
1:-.:<._!ll!RI>R, Oct. 27, l <.1<.16, at AI (reporting the circumstances leading up to the conviction). 
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she did so in an effort to help the girl, the Sullivan County District 
Attorney argued that Hartford had done so to help her nineteen-
year-old son avoid a statutory rape conviction.;; Despite Hartf()fd's 
etlorts, the son faced a jail sentence of up to thirty months. 6 Many 
people (including, apparently, the seven men and five women on the 
jury who convicted her-and a majority in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives7) saw Hartford's actions as the selfish exploitation of a vul-
nerable child and a high-handed disregard of the right of the child's 
parent( s) to determine the medical procedures and cultural values 
that should play a role in the daughter's life. Kathryn Kolbert, of the 
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, and Hartford's defense at-
torney, saw Hartford as a heroine who facilitated a young woman's 
lawful choice in the face of an uncaring or even hostile world.~ 
The Hartford case introduced a new element in the debate over 
the legality of abortion: Hartford had to take the girl to another state 
for the abortion. Pennsylvania has a rather strict parental notice and 
consent law/ the constitutionality of which has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 10 but three states that border 
Pennsylvania do not have comparable requirements. 11 Thus, even 
when a state like Pennsylvania has strict parental notice and consent 
laws, they may be evaded easily in a nearby state where public au-
thorities are sympathetic to abortion rights. In another case, for ex-
ample, parents in Pennsylvania sued a school district after a school's 
guidance counselor arranged for high school girls to travel to New 
Jersey for abortions without informing their parents. 12 The New Jer-
5. McCullough, Woman Convicted, supra note 4, at Al. 
6. Id. (reporting that the son pleaded guilty to statutory rape and was serving a sen-
tence of twelve to thirty months). 
7. See David E. Rosenbaum, House Passes Bill to Restrict Minors' Abortions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 1999, at A17. While the proposed statute was not simply a response to the 
Hartford case, that case was discussed in the debates over the proposal; efforts to enact such a 
statute have foundered on the failure of the House and Senate to agree on the precise terms of 
the statute, although such statutes have now passed both houses of Congress. See Gillian E. 
Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1470, 1536-
37 (2007). 
8. Marie McCullough, Abortion Case Appeal Poses Conflict of Rights, PHILA. 
l:\QUIRER, June 12, 1997, at Bl. 
9. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 3206 (West 2000). 
10. Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,899 (1992). 
11. Delaware, Maryland, and New York do not require parental notice and consent. 
12. Vanessa Dea, Abonion Debate: Do the Schools HaPe a Role in Counseling Girls?, 
EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 7, 2001, at l. 
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sey Supreme Court had declared the state's parental notice law un-
constitutional.13 West Virginia, another state bordering Pennsylvania, 
has a strong parental notice and consent statute,14 yet there might 
even have been similar evasions of Pennsylvania law there as well. 
The lack of published reports of such incidents might merely mean 
that those involved have not been caught. 
The Pennsylvania stories present what on its face is a fairly nar-
rmv, technical legal question: can a state like Pennsylvania apply its 
laws to abortions involving the state's citizens that take place outside 
the state? This question is likely to become more prominent in the 
future if the Supreme Court loosens the federal constitutional stan-
dards tor abortion laws. 15 While most readers will immediately think 
in terms of a possible criminal prosecution, as in the Hartford case, 
the question also implicates questions of civil litigation. Supporters 
or opponents of abortion might seek injunctions16 or the appoint-
ment of a guardian for the mother or the child, or even to bring suit 
for damages against the abortion provider or others involved in pro-
curing the out-of-state abortion, whether for negligence in perform-
ing the abortion 17 or tor injuring a legal right recognized in one state 
but not in another. 1 ~ 
13. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Fanner, 762 A.2d 620,638 (N.J. 2000). 
14. W.VA. CODE§ 16-2F-3 (2001) (requiring parental notification). On the constitu-
tionalitY of such statutes under the federal constitution, see Ayotte v. Planned Ptlrenthood of 
Northern New Enlfland, 546 U.S. 320, 326-27 (2006). 
15. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a tCderal statute prohibit-
ing partial-birth abortions and distinguishing Stenberlf v. Carhart); Stenberg ,._ Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (invalidating a Nebraska statute banning partial-birth abortions f(x un-
duly burdening the right to choose abortion); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (adopting an undue 
burden standard for abortion regulations under which laws restricting abortion after viability 
must include exceptions for pregnancies that endanger the life or health of the mother). See 
generally JOSEPH W. DELLAPE:-.'NA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 932-37 
(2006). 
16. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 188.250(5) (West 2008) (authorizing an injunction 
against a person seeking to aid a minor in obtaining an abortion without parental consent). 
The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 
220 S.W.3d 732, 745 (Mo. 2007). 
17. For examples of malpractice actions arising from an abortion, albeit not necessarily 
involving travel across a state line, see Gaydar v. Sociedad In.rtituto Gineco-Quirurigico, 345 
F.3d 15 (I st Cir. 2003 ); Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 
1989); Boykin v. Malfnolia Bay, Inc., 570 So. 2d 639 (Ala. 1990); Perlfuson 1•. Tarnis, 937 P.2d 
347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Vuitch v. Purr, 482 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1984); Adams 1•. Family 
Planning AsJ·'n Medical Group, 733 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), appeal denied, 744 
N.E.2d 283 (Ill. 2001 ); Blair v. Hutzel Hosp., 552 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), rep'd 
mem., 569 N.W.2d 167 (Mich. 1997); Kiddy v. Lipscomb, 628 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1993 ); Bid-
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In this Article, I propose to analyze conflicts of law precedents 
and theory to explore the extent to which a state can apply its law on 
abortion to abortions performed outside the state but bearing a sig-
nificant connection to the state. In attempting to resolve such ques-
tions, we enter into the domain of choice of law, part of the field of 
conflicts of law. This domain is notoriously unstable and contcsted. 19 
This instability allows legal commentators to project their attitudes 
towards abortion (and many other matters) in analyzing and con-
struing the relevant authorities to resolve choice of law issues. I shall 
strive to avoid doing that, but it is for others to decide whether I 
succeed.20 I begin in Part I by examining why differences among 
states regarding abortion policy arise and why those difTcrcnce arc 
likely to persist. I then proceed in Part II by describing choice of law 
theory generally. In Part III, I examine the application of choice of 
law theory to litigation involving differing abortion laws in difkrcnt 
states. I conclude in Part N that states can apply their laws to their 
son v. Reprod. Health Servs., 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Blackburn 1'. Blue Moun· 
tain Women's Clinic, 951 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1997); Ferrara v. Bernstein, 613 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 
1993); Phillips v. A Triangle Women's Health Clinic, 573 S.E.2d 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); 
Hunte v. Hinkley, 731 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Smesac v. Associates in Obstetrics 0-
Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900 (Vt. 1982); and Lake v. N. Va. Women's Medical Ctr., Inc., 483 
S.E.2d 220 (Va. 1997). See generally Thomas Eller, Informed Commt CiPil Actions jiJr Post· 
Abortion Psychological Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 639 ( 1996 ); Tamar Lewin, Malprac· 
tice Lawyers' New Target, MED. EC0:-1., June 26, 1995, at 53. 
18. See, eg., Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 188.250(2), (3) (West 2008) (imposing civil liability on 
persons who aid a minor in obtaining an abortion without parental consent). The constitutio· 
nality of this provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 
(Mo. 2007). See also Sherman v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 670 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a phy· 
sician's suit against a malpractice insurer); Broemmer v. Abortion Scrv. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 
P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that a woman cannot be bound to arbitrate an abortion-
malpractice claim); Bickham v. Selcke, 576 N.E.2d 975 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding pro· 
fCssional sanctions against a physician because of the negligent pert(>rnuncc of an abortion). 
Products liability claims might also arise in some circumstances. For example, press reports 
have indicated that the Chinese pharmaceutical company that manubcturcs mifCpristonc ( JUL 
486 ), an abortion-inducing drug used in the tlrst two months of pregnancy, h.1s a record of 
producing lethally defective versions of other drugs. Jake Hooker & W.1lt Bogdanich, 1ililltcd 
Drugs Linked to Maker of Abortion Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at AI. While there is no 
evidence of such failures in the manufacture of mitepristonc, if it were to happen, the question 
would arise whether a products liability claim could be maintained under a state's l,J\\'S and 
against any of several possible defendants. 
19. See generally EUGENE f. SCOLES ET AL., CONI'LICTS 01' LAW (3d cd. 2000); 
RUSSELL). WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONfLICTS 01' LAW (5th cd. 2006). 
20. I discuss my personal attitudes towards abortion, and the bases t<>r mv personal atti-
tudes, in a "personal aside" in my book on the history of abortion. DELLAI'E~~c\, supra note 
15, at ix-xi. 
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citizens when they travel out of the state in an effort to avoid abor-
tion restrictions. 
I. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER 
ABORTION 
Until sometime in the nineteenth or twentieth century, abortion 
was tantamount to suicide for the mother, and thus, there was little 
controversy about prohibiting it. 21 When changing medical technol-
ogies-the development of analgesics, anesthetics, antibiotics, and 
antiseptics-made abortion less dangerous for the mother and more 
diflicult to detect,22 societies around the world responded to the re-
sulting challenges to social mores and legal doctrine from increasing 
resort to abortion. In the nineteenth century, nearly everyone-led 
by feminists, physicians, and religious leaders-responded by treating 
abortion as a legal issue, with legislatures around the world enacting 
statutes to repress or prohibit abortion. 23 In the second half of the 
tvventieth century, as the medical profession perfected techniques for 
doing abortions, and as many men and women found their personal 
goals to be best served by reducing or even eliminating the role of 
children in their lives, many came to prefer to treat abortion as a 
medical problem rather than to prohibit it as a legal problem. Legis-
latures in many nations, particularly industrialized nations, remolded 
their abortion statutes to facilitate the choices of women (and often 
of their men) to abort pregnancies. 24 
Yet the perceived interests of society in unborn children were al-
so changing as a result of new medical information and technologies 
f{xused on human reproduction. 25 This shift began early in the nine-
teenth century with the realization that a fundamental genetic trans-
formation occurred at conception.26 We now know that limited fetal 
brain waves can be detected at eight weeks of gestation. 27 Experi-
21. Sec lfOtcm/ly DELLAPE~NA, supra note 15, at 29-56. 
22. Id.at333-34, 350,367,454-59,481-82. 
23. !d. at 232-62,268-370,372-409,412-16,419-51. 
24. Sec id. at 575-629, 722-49. 
25. Sec id. at 749-69. 
26. Sec id. at 256-62; see also HAROLD MOROWITZ & JAMES TREFIL, THE fACTS OF 
L!H: SC:IE~C:E AN!l THE ABORTION COt--:TROVERSY 43-58 (1992 ). 
27. Hclimibal Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 JAMA 112, 113 (1964); see al.ro Jo-
seph W. Dellapenna, Nor Piety Nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 6 COLUM. HUM. 
RT\. L. RE\'. 379,401-09 (1974). 
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mentation during abortions has shown that fetal brains react to mor-
phine, scopolamine, and thiopental in characteristic human patterns 
as early as ten weeks of gestation, indicating that the early fetal brain 
already has drug receptors and synaptic transmitters capable of react-
ing to stimuli and of transmitting those reactions throughout the still 
immature nervous system.28 While fetal brains admittedly are physio-
logically immature, so are all human brains until puberty. 
Moreover, our ability to interact directly with a fetus has also ad-
vanced dramatically in recent years. Physicians now can diagnose and 
treat unborn children independently of the mother. 29 A fetologist 
can remove a child from the womb for surgery and then return it to 
the womb to complete gestation, or the fetologist can perform a 
medical procedure inside the womb. 30 Physicians have even observed 
fetuses as early as nine weeks in gestation covering their eyes to 
shield them from the bright lights of surgery and covering their ears 
to avoid loud noises in the operating room. 31 In its most extreme 
form, physicians can sustain a woman's body after her brain has died 
in order to produce a healthy child. 32 
Amniocentesis, amniography, embryoscopy, fetography, tetosco-
py, radiography, ultrasound, and other techniques almost compel us 
to think about the fetus as an independent being. ' 3 Even such appar-
ently innocuous technical developments as the ability to picture the 
28. Nils Petter Jorgenson & Karel Marshall, Influence of Thiopental Anaestht'Jia on Fetal 
Motor Behaviour in Early l'n;_qntmcy, 17 EARLY HuM. DEV. 71, 77 ( 1988). 
29. jUDITH !loss, THE BIRTH LOTTERY: PRENATAL DIM;NOSIS A:-.;D SELECTIVE 
ABORTION 71-76 ( 1993); GENETIC DISORDERS AND THE l'ETUS: DIAG:-.;osiS, PREVENTION 
AND TREATMENT (Aubrey Milunsky ed., 4th ed. 1998); THE UNBOR:-.; PATIENT: THE ART 
AND SCIENCE OF l'ETAL DEVELOPME:-.IT (Michael Harrison ed., 200 l ). 
30. N. Scott Adzick & Michael R. Harrison, Fetal Suzqical Therapy, 343 LANCET 897, 
900-01 (1994); MitchellS. Golbus ct a!., bt Utero Treatment of Urinarv Ii·act Obstruction, 
142 AM.). OBSTET. & GYNECOLOGY 383 (1982); M.T. Longaker eta!., Maternal Outcome 
After Open Fetal Surgery, 265 JAMA 737 ( 1991 ); Sandra Blakeslee, Fetus Returned to Womb 
Followincif Su,~qerv, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1986, at C1. 
31. THOMAS VER:-.IEY & )OHN KELLY, THE SECRET LIFE 01' THE UNBORN CHILD 36-
42 ( !981 ); su also A.W. Liley, If1e Fetus As a Personality, 6 AUSTL. & N.Z. ). PSYCHIATRY 99 
( 1972 ), rcpriuted in I FETAL THERAPY 8, l 0, 13 ( 1986) (describing tctal behaviors, including 
movement and rhumb sucking as early as eight weeks of gestation). 
32. David R. Field et al., Maternal Brain Death Duriltlf l'r(!J1ttmcy: Medical and Ethim! 
Issues, 260 JAMA 816, 816-17 ( 1988 ). 
33. N. Caccia et al., Impact of Prenatal Testing on Maternal-Fetal Bmtdincif: Chorionic 
Villus Swmpli1tq Ver.rus Amnioceltte.ris, 165 AM. ). 0BSTET. & GYl\:ECOLOl;Y 1122, !124-25 
( 1991 ). See "qer;erally Randi Hutter Epstein, Advances, and AI{!Jst, iu a Ne'" Era of Ultrasound, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at 1-'7; E. Albert Reece et al., Embrvoscopy: A Closer Look at First-
Trimester Diacifttosis and Treatment, 166 AM.). 0BSTET. & GYNECOLOGY 775 ( !992 ). 
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unborn infant by a sonogram or to hear the child's heart beating 
(today a ubiquitous experience fairly early in pregnancy) alter our re-
lationship to the fetus and thus our concept of the being with which 
we deal. 34 The effects of fetal medicine and fetal imaging on the 
meaning of pregnancy are, of course, not objective, yet such images 
have a peculiar power, as noted by rhetorician Celeste Condit: 
Visual f(xms of persuasion present special problems of analysis. Vis-
ual images seduce our attention and demand our assent in a pecu-
liar and gripping fashion. Many audiences are leery of verbal con-
structions, which only "represent" reality, but because we humans 
tend to trust our own senses, we take what we see to be true. 
Therefore our trust in what we see gives visual images particular 
rhetorical potency .... It is in the translation of visual images into 
verbal meanings that the rhetoric of images operates most power-
fully. 35 
Thus, when Life magazine published photos by Lennart Nilsson in 
1965 documenting fetal development through all major stages,36 just 
when the abortion reform movement was picking up steam, it spread 
the image of a fetus as a "little person" to the general public and 
helped fuel the anti-abortion movement. 37 
In the United States, supporters of abortion rights grew impa-
tient with the slow, difficult, and uncertain legislative process. Whe-
reas abortion laws around the world were altered legislatively, abor-
tion supporters in the U.S. turned to the courts to establish a 
34. for examples of such images, see LANGMAN'S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 80, 82-83 
(T.W. Sadler ed., 5th cd. 1985); and Lennart Nilsson, The First Days of Creation, LIFE, Aug. 
1990, at 26, 40-43. for discussions of the power of such images, sec, for example, Boss, supra 
note 29, at 65-68, 119; DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 758-63, 767-69; ANN OAKLEY, THE 
CAPTU!zt.D WOMB 155-86 ( 1984); and John C. fletcher & Mark I. Evans, SoundinJJ Boards: 
Maternal BrmdirtB in Early Fetal Ultrasound ExaminMions, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392-
93 (1983). 
35. CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: 
COMMLTNICATINl; SOCIAL CHANGE 81 ( 1990). 
36. The Dmma of Life Before Birth, LirE, Apr. 30, 1965, at 54. 
37. KAREN NEWMAN, FETAL POSITIONS: INDIVIDUALS, SCJE"iCE, VISUAI.nY 8-16 
( 1996 ). Claims such as those recently made by Susan Appleton that abortion laws are not 
about ICtuses but about keeping women in their place present an ideological belief~ but do not 
comport with the experiences or bel ids of those opposed to the legalization of abortion; this 
becomes particularly apparent when one examines the attitudes of nineteenth-century feminists 
and of nineteenth-century women physicians. for Appleton's argmm:nt, sec Susan frelich Ap-
pleton, Gender, Abortion, and "Frape/ After Roc's End, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.). 655, 660-67 
(2007). Sec al.ro DELLAPE;\JNA, .rupra note 15, at 373-406. 
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constitutional right to choose. 38 Unlike the legislative solutions em-
braced in other countries, however, the American solution generated 
enormous controversy and even violence. 3~ This eventually led to the 
Supreme Court disavowing judicial micromanagement of abortion 
rights.40 Yet ultimately, the majority on the Court could not keep 
their hands off the abortion controvcrsy. 41 This in turn generated 
even more controversy and a subsequent Supreme Court decision 
that left only confusion about the possible direction abortion laws 
would or could take in the ncar future. 42 
In the current legal and social context, the struggle over abortion 
will likely continue. The increasingly uncertain posture of the Su-
preme Court leaves growing room for divergence among states in 
their laws regulating abortion. States have already enacted diverse 
laws regarding certain aspects of abortion,43 and these differences are 
only likely to incrcase.44 These differences will then lead to the 
choice of law issues considered in the following section. 
II. CHOICE OF LAW GENERALLY 
We begin with the legal principles used to determine the out-
come of civil litigation. These principles will be used to resolve ci\·il 
claims relating to abortions with significant connections to more 
than one state. These principles are a convenient starting point, both 
because they arc better known among lawyers and judges and be-
cause they will inform to a significant degree the comparable prin-
ciples applied in criminal cases. Today, choice of law in the United 
States for the most part remains a matter of state law. As a result, 
three different choice of law theories compete for acceptance: ( l) a 
rule-centered "vested rights" approach aimed at coordinating com-
peting sovereignties; ( 2) a methodology-centered "interest analysis" 
aimed at coordinating social policies; and ( 3) a new rule-centered 
3/l. See Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (overruled in part); Doc,._ Bolton, 410 US. 
179 ( 1973 ). Sccgenerallv DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 672~95 . 
. W. DELLAPE:-o;!';A,supranote 15,at771~ill9. 
40. Sec Planned Parenthood of Sc. Pa. \', Casey, 505 U.S. il33 ( 1992 ). See J70lt'1'allv 
DELI.APENNA, supra note 15, at il3il~85. 
41. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (20()()); DELLAI'EN:-o;A, supra note 15, .1t 
932~37. 
42. See, CJf., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 US 124 (2007). 
43. On the rcmge of legislative responses to abortion, sec E\'A Rli!HN. ABORTION, 
i'OLIT!CS, AND THE COURTS 126~49 (rev. ed. 19il7). See alm supm pp. 1651-53. 
44. DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 976~94. 
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"neoterritorialist" approach aimed at coordinating the parties' expec-
tations. 
In the following subsections, I briefly describe each theory and 
then discuss whether these theories should be applied in criminal 
prosecutions and the constitutional limitations on choice of law. 
A. The Vested Rights Approach to Choice ofLaw 
The tlrst Restatement of Conflicts45 summarizes the vested rights 
system of choice of law. Under this system, courts first characterize 
the nature of the suit and then select the jurisdiction under whose 
law rights of that type "vest." For torts, rights vest at the place where 
the injury occurred;46 f(Jr contracts, at the place where the contract 
was made, or where the contract was to be performed;47 and for 
property rights, the location of the property at the time the rights in 
question vested.4R 
Vested rights suffer from apparent rigidity due to its formal re-
liance on a single factor-the state with sovereign authority over a 
transaction or event4\) -to select the law for every aspect of a suit. 
Courts developed a plethora of escape devices (characterization, ren-
JJoi, public policy, etc.) to avoid the ostensibly inexorable commands 
of these apparently simple rules in order make the system far less cer-
tain than it appears on the surface, and perhaps more just. 50 
B. Interest Analysis 
Over the past seventy years, American legal scholars have devel-
oped choice of law techniques that are both multifactoral and policy 
sensitive." 1 The resulting approach is termed interest analysis. Argua-
45. RESTATEME!';T Of CONFLICT OF LAWS (I 934). 
46. ld. §§ 377-371l. 
47. ld. §§ 332, 35R. 
4R. ld. § 20R. 
49. Sec, Clf., Ala. G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, I I So. R03, 808-09 (Ala. I892) ("[E]ach sove-
rcigntv, state or nation, has the exclusive power to finally determine and declare what act or 
omissions in the conduct of one to another ... shall impose a liability in damages f(Jr the con-
sequent injurv, and the courts of no other sovereignty can impute a damnifYing quality to an 
.let or omission which afhlrded no cause of action where it transpired."). 
50. Sec JJCncrallv SCOLES ET AL., Iupra note 19, at I I 9-45, 697-70 l; WEINTRAUB, su· 
pra note I 9, at 52-116, 400-0R; Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rcthinki1~q 
Cmtflirts, 97 M!C:H. L. REV. 2448, 2455-6I, 2471-76 (I999). 
51. Sa, CJJ., David 1'. Cwcrs, A Critique of the Choice·ofLall' Problem, 47 HARV. L. 
RFV. I73 (I933). 
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bly better suited to coordinating policies of states within a tederal 
union, it appears predominant in the United States today."2 Interest 
analysis comes in many diftcrcnt guises, the best known of which arc 
Brainerd Currie's "governmental interest analysis,"""' Robert Ldlar's 
"choice influencing considerations" (also known as the "better law" 
approach),54 Willis Reese's "most significant relationship" test (also 
known as the "Second Restatement" approach),55 and Russell Wein-
traub's approach, often referred to as a "functional analysis. ""6 While 
scholars debate the flne points of the diftcrences between these ana-
lyses, often with great vehemence, "7 in broad outline the various 
forms of interest analysis arc actually quite similar. 
Each approach focuses on selecting the governing rule of law for 
a particular issue, and not, as under vested rights, the governing ju-
52. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 68-102, 701-60; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 
408-22. 
53. BRAil\:EIU) CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS o:-.: Co:-.:FLIC:TS OF LAWS ( 1963). All modern 
choice of law theories arc deeply indebted to Pro!Cssor Currie. See, elf., Tooker v. Lopez, 249 
N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969); Lilienthal v. Kautrnan, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964). for approaches 
described after Currie's death as derived from him, sec Bernlmrd F. Harrah '.f Club, 546 P2d 
719 (Cal. 1976), superseded by statute, CAL. Bt'S. & PRO!'. ConE§ 25602; I.c.1 Brilma\'CI', In-
terest Analysis and the Myth of' Le._qislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 ( 1980) I hereinafter 
Brilmayer, !merest Analvsisj; and Hcrma Hill Kay, The U.rr of' ComparatiFc Impair111mt to Rr-
solve True Conflicts: An E1'aluation of the California E.xperieuce, 68 CAL. L. RfX. 577 (I <J80). 
Seegeneral~v ScOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 100-01, 701-25; WEI"'TRi\LIB, ntjmr note l<J, 
at 8-9, 408-21; Roosevelt, sttpra note 50, at 2461-65, 2467-71, 2477-81; Can·). Simson, 
New Directiom in Choice ofLaJP: Alternatipcs to Interest Analy.ris, 24 CoR:-.:EI.!.INT'I. ! .. ).I 'iS 
( 1991). 
54. ROBERT A. LHLAR, LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL III & ROBERT L. FELIX, A,\\EIZIC\N 
CONFLICTS LAW (4th ed. I <J86 ). This approach is best known l(>r recommending application 
of the "better rule of law." !d. at 297-300. See, C!J., Turcotte v. ford Motor Co., 4<J4 F.2d 
173 (1st Cir. 1974 ); Hague 1'. Allstate Ins. Co., 28<J N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978 ), afTd 011 ot!Jcr 
grounds, 44<J U.S. 302 ( 1981 ). See gmcrally ScOI.ES ET AI.., supra note I 'i, ,n 10 I, 72S-31; 
WEINTRA.UB, suprt! note 19, at 11-12, 444-48. 
55. Willis Reese was the Reporter tc>r the RFSTAI'I-:1\IENT (SECOND) Of CONH.IC! OF 
lAWS ( 1 <J71 ). Many courts have purported to apply this method. Su, e F' Dym v. (;ordon, 
209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1%5), overruled iu part by Tooker\'. Lopez, 24<J N.E.2d 394 (~.Y 
196<J); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967); Gutierrez v. Collins, 
583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., S55 1)2d <J97 (Wash. 1976). 
See generally SCOLES ET AI.., supra note 19, at 58-68, <J5-l 00, 732-41; WEI:-.:TRAllB, .rztpm 
note 19, at 7-8, 382-93. 
56. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 373-75, 522-41; sa also Scou.s ET AI .. , supm 
note 19, at 43-47. 
57. See, elf., David E. Seidclson, Interest Analysis or the Rcstatemcut Scomd of' Conflict.r: 
Which is the Preferable Approach to Re.wlrit~q Choice-ofLaJJJ l'roblmts?, 27 DLIQ. L. RE\·. 73 
(1988). 
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risdiction for the entire litigation. 58 Each asks a court to begin by ex-
amining the potentially relevant formal rules of law to see if they are 
in fact different or if they would lead to different results in the case. 
If they are not different or would produce the same result if applied 
to the case, there simply is no conflict. If the formal rules of law are 
diflerent or would lead to different results (an apparent conflict), a 
court then examines the policies underlying the formal rules. 59 If the 
policy of only one formal rule would be affected by its application, 
there is a false conflict, and the court should apply the only relevant 
rule of law, described as the law of the only state with an interest in 
having its law applied.60 If the policies of more than one formal rule 
will be affected, there is a true conflict. On the other hand, if the pol-
icies underlying every potentially relevant rule of law would not be 
affected by non-application, there is what has come to be called an 
unprovided-for case. 61 Only for true conflicts or unprovided-for cases 
do the several theories posit widely differing ways to resolve the con-
flict. 
With a few exceptions, courts have not concerned themselves 
with the fine points of these various systems. Rather, courts have pre-
ferred to synthesize elements of the several analyses in an attempt to 
find the most relevant law for a particular issue in a case. 62 Because 
the modern approaches depend on virtually unanswerable questions 
about the nature and weight of competing state policies, the synthe-
sis in most courts features a pronounced bias in favor of plaintiffs in 
torts-or at least a pronounced bias in favor of the forum's law, 
which amounts to the same thing if plaintiffs choose a forum because 
of its favorable law.63 In contracts cases, the synthesis favored by the 
58. See, CB., Caruolo v. john Crane, Inc., 226 !:'.3d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 2000). 
5':!. Sec, t'B., Dym, 20':! N.E.2d at 7':!4, overruled in part by Tooker v. Lopez, 249 
l'\.E.2d 3<.14 (N.Y. 196<.1). 
60. Tooker, 24':! N.E.2d at 3<.15~96, 398~<.19. 
61. It is not at all clear that there is such a thing as an "unprovided-for case," but the 
phrase is widely used in conflicts scholarship. See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-
jiJr" Case, 75 VA. L. REv. 1045 ( 1 <.189); Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2520~25. 
62. Sec, eg., filetech S.A. v. france Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 f.2d 149, 167~68 (3d Cir. 1980), reJJ'd on other grounds, 454 
U.S. 235 ( 1981 ). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 79~84, 755~59; Roosevelt, 
sttpra note 50, at 2463. 
63. Sec, e.._11., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978); fisher v. 
Huck, 624 l'.2d 177 (Or. Ct. App. 1981 ); see also Brilmayer, Interest Analysis, supra note 53; 
Willis L.M. Reese, American Trends in PriJJate International Law: Academic and Judicial Ma-
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courts generally seeks to effectuate the intent of the partics.64 Courts 
are particularly likely to follow the law chosen in an express choice of 
law clause.65 
Depending as it does on imponderables, interest analysis at best 
is complex, confusing, and highly unpredictable. In an occasional, 
surprising case, a court has favored a foreign, anti-plaintiff law for a 
tort despite apparent general preference for a plaintiff-favoring, fo-
rum-favoring interest analysis.66 Similarly, courts have held contracts 
invalid on dubious grounds in an occasional case despite the usual 
preference for validity. 67 Some courts have applied interest analysis to 
such areas as property or family law, although for these areas, courts 
tend more strongly to stay with the traditional system f()f choice of 
law.68 The complexity and uncertainty of interest analysis makes it an 
ideal escape device. A court can justifY using any law it wants without 
resort to traditional escape devices,69 and thus the traditional escape 
11ipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33 VAND. L. REV. 717, 727-29, 734-37 
( 1980); Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2464-65. 
64. See, e.._11., Seetransport \Viking Trader Schithrhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. Komman· 
ditgescllschati: v. Republic of Romania, 123 f. Supp. 2d 174, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); fal-
coal, Inc. v. Turkiye Komur Isletmeleri Kurumu, 660 f. Supp. 1536, 1542 (S.D. Tex. 1987); 
Bernkrant v. fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961 ). See gmerallv Scou-:s ET AL., supra note 19, at 
857-80; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 481-98, 523; Reese, supra note 63, at 737. 
65. Wallace Hardware Co. v. Abrams, 223 F.3d 382, 397-400 (6th Cir. 2000); Fina, 
Inc. v. Arco, 200 F.3d 266, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2000); sec a!Jo RESTATEME~T (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT Of LAWS§ 187 ( 1971 ); Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. K/XXI.S, art. 7, reprinted in 33 !NT'!. LEGAL 
MATE!UALS 732, 734 (1994). But see Krock v. Lipsay, 97 f.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1996); j.S. 
Alberici Const. Co. v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., 750 A.2d 518,521 (Del. 2000). Scc.._lfmerallv 
Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. I. 
TRA~S:-.:AT'L L. 421 (1995); Philip A. Buhler, Forum Selection and Choice ofl,aw Clause.< in 
International Contracts: A United States Viewpoint with Particular Reference to Maritime Con-
tracts and Bills ofLadin.._lf, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. I ( 1995 ). 
66. See, eJf., Ottshore Rental Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 729 (C.1l. 1978); 
Dym v. c;ordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965), oJJerruled in part by Tooker \". Lopez, 249 
N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969); Casey v. Manson Constr. Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967). 
67. See, eB., Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 19~3); 
Lilienthal v. Kautinan, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964 ). 
68. See, e.._11., Carter v. Sandberg, 458 A.2d 924 (N.J. Super. 1983) (properrv); lit rc 
Lenhcrr's Estate, 314 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974) (marriage). 
69. Compare Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F .2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Washing-
ton's statute of limitations to a case brought in a Washington court), ll'ith Henry \·. Rich.lrd-
son-Merrell Co., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying Quebec's statute of limitations to a 
case brought in a New jersey court), and Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (N.J. 
1973) (applying North Carolina's statute of limitations to a case brought in a New Jersev 
court). Compare Martineau v. Guertin, 751 A.2d 776 (Vt. 2000) (applying Vermont law to 
case brought in a Vermont court), ll'ith Myers v. Langlois, 721 A.2d 129 (Vt. 1998) (using a 
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devices have tended to atrophy or even disappear under interest anal-
ysis in favor of result-oriented application of interest analysis-
essentially, interest analysis is an ad hoc approach to each case. 70 
C. The Neoterritorialist Approach 
Some state courts have rejected interest analysis because of its in-
herent uncertainty. 71 They have continued to apply the vested rights 
or "territorialist" approach despite the rigidities and other difficulties 
in that system.72 Some courts and scholars, disillusioned with both 
vested rights (too rigid) and interest analysis (too whimsical), have 
attempted to develop yet a third approach that attempts to combine 
what are arguably the best points of both systems.73 This new ap-
proach is the "neoterritorialist" approach. 
Under the neoterritorialist approach, courts are expected to work 
out territorially centered rules that are more narrowly drawn than the 
rules for vested rights. As the rules are more narrowly drawn, they, 
like interest analysis, are more sensitive to the policies at stake for 
particular issues and therefore presumably are more just. Yet, being 
based on territorially sensitive rules, the approach is expected to be 
more predictable than interest analysis has proven to be. Further-
more, neoterritorialism stresses the expectations of the parties, even 
in torts cases, rather than guessing about the policies underlying 
competing laws.74 Neoterritorialism localizes these expectations diffe-
"most significant relationship" test to apply Quebec law to a case brought in a Vermont 
court). 
70. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 755-60; WEI;-.;TRAUil, supra note 19, at 373-74, 
421-33; Reese, supra note 63, at 720-30; Simson, supra note 53, at 195. 
71. See, e.Jf., Braxton v. Anco Elec., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 914,915 (N.C. 1991); Boudreau 
v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849,853-54 (N.C. 1988). 
72. Sec, eg., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844--45 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 231 (Md. 2000); BHP Petrol. (Americas), Inc. 
v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., I P.3d 1253 (Wyo. 2000). 
73. Sec Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); First Nat'! Bank in 
Fort Collins\'. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 320 (Colo. 1973); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 
856-57 (Pa. 1970). SeeJJC1lemlly SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 761-97; WEINTRAUB, supra 
note 19, at 426-4S; David Cavers, The Choice of Law Process, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1965); 
Reese, supra note 63, at 730-34. 
74. Sec Rostck, 514 1'.2d at 320; Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-SS (N.Y. 
1972); Cipolla, 267 A.2d at 856-57; see also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 761-97; 
WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 426-32; Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to 
FJficimcy in Choiu of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000). The relevance of the parties' ex-
pectations in torts cases is emphatically denied under interest analysis. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 
N.E.2d 394,399 (N.Y. 1969). 
1663 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
rently tor rules meant to regulate conduct ("admonitory rules," 
which turn on where the regulated conduct occurs) and rules meant 
to allocate the financial consequences of an act or event ( "compensa-
tory rules," which turn the relation of the act or event to the domi-
ciles of the parties). 75 
Specific neoterritorialist rules have not been accepted outside the 
forum that created them?6 Thus, consensus exists only at a high level 
of generality, particularly as so many rules of law are simultaneously 
both admonitory and compensatory, as those terms are used in neo-
territorialism. Supporters of "neoterritorialism" have felt obliged to 
accept the possibility of displacing their rules in unspecified cases. A 
residual interest analysis remains their major escape device. 77 
D. Choice of Law in Criminal Matters 
The foregoing discussion of the so-called conflicts revolution on 
its face has little to do with laws making abortion a crime. It is com-
monly believed that choice of law theory does not apply to criminal 
matters. This view likely arose because a criminal court will always 
apply its own substantive law of crimes, and if it does not have legis-
lative jurisdiction to apply its own law to a criminal case, it will dis-
miss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.78 So strong is this 
tradition that foreign laws or judgments that are deemed to be penal 
"in the international sense" will not be recognized or enf()rced in the 
United States.79 
75. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 685, 692--94 (N.Y. 1985 ). 
See generally ScoLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 761-66; WEI:-.ITRAUB, supra note 19, at 471-
73; John T. Cross, The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United States Choice-ofLaJP, 
36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425 (2003). 
76. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 426-33; Reese, supra note 63, at 734-37. 
77. See Anderson v. SAM Airlines, 939 F. Supp. 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1996 ); Towley v. King 
Arthur Rinks, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 728 (N.Y. 1976); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 
457-58 (N.Y. 1972). 
78. See Palliser v. U.S., 136 U.S. 257, 267-68 (1890); State v. Harvey, 730 S.W.2d 
271, 278-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Fuller, 586 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367-68 (App. Div.), 
appeal denied, 605 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1992). See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & Ausn~ W. 
SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTNE CRIMINAL LAW 180 ( 1986 ). The criminal cases do not seem to use 
the phrase "legislative jurisdiction," but it has been used in civil cases. See Bradford Elec. Light 
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 156 ( 1932 ). The phrase seems to explain the point of the crim-
inal cases. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1865, 1892-95 (1987). 
79. See, eg., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657,682-83 (1892). 
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VVhilc this is true, it begs the question of whether a state or na-
tion has legislative jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction to prescribe the 
law applicable to an action or an event. Ho This is a question that 
choice of law theory seeks to resolve in the several approaches to civil 
litigation. It is also a question that, as regards the application of pub-
lic law such as criminal law, has been addressed more pointedly in in-
ternational conflicts of law than in the interstate conflicts of law on 
which most courts and scholars have f(xused their attention. Many 
scholars have asserted over the years that limitations under interna-
tional litigation regarding legislative jurisdiction ("jurisdiction to 
prescribe")H 1 arc fundamentally different from the limitations applied 
in whollv domestic contexts. 82 
Yet the fact remains that, for the most part, the entire field of 
conflicts of law-including choice of law theory-developed in the 
United States through the application of principles borrowed from 
international law to the interstate context. 83 Today, there is a good 
deal of controversy over recourse to international legal sources for 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution. 84 Justice Antonin Scalia has led 
XO. Sec Appleton, mpm note 37, at 667 ("Despite our intuitive resistance to the notion 
tlut a state can stretch its criminal prohibitions bcvond its borders to reach conduct that is law-
ful \\here pcrt(mncd, legal authority docs not conclusively bear out the underlying intui-
tions."). On the reach ofkgisL1ti1·c jurisdiction, Jec infrll pp. 1666-73. 
X 1. The phrase "legislative jurisdiction" is used in the Restatement of Conflicts, while the 
phr.1sc "jurisdiction to prescribe" is used in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. See 
RESTi\TE~lE:-.:T (SE<:o:-.:n) Of' CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 9 cmt. b (1971); RESTJ\TEMDIT (TH!lm) 
01' FotzEJ(;N RELATIONS LAW§ 401 ( 19117); see also Willis L.M. Reese, LegislatiPe Jurisdiction, 
7X OlLUM. L. REY. 15117,15117 (1978). 
112. Sa Scoa:s ET AL., supra note 19, at 307-09 (discussing "jurisdictional reasonable-
ness" in denying jurisdiction in t(Jreign cases); WEINTRA.UB, supra note 19, at 120-21; Frede-
rick K. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Communities: A 
Compari.rrm, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1203, 121 0-ll ( 1984). 
83. See, e.._q., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 579-82 (1906) (applying interna-
tional law to determine whether there is an obligation to recognize a foreign divorce); Hun-
tington\. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 ( 1892) (holding that the question of what laws or judg-
ments arc "penal" is "not one of local, but of international law"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 722 (1877) ("[Ejxcept as restrained and limited by [the Constitution, States] possess and 
exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law ... are applicable 
. to them."); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174-76 (1850) (applying the 
"well established rules of international law" to determine when a judgment is entitled to full 
faith and credit). See .._qmerally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. 
I:-.:T'L L. 1, 50-54 (2006); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Un-
constitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971-72 ( 1997). 
84. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, 
C.J. & Thomas,)., dissenting) (denouncing recourse to international legal sources as a device 
for interpreting the U.S. Constitution); see also Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources 
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the charge against recourse to international legal sources, yet even 
Justice Scalia relies on principles of international law to decide choice 
oflaw guestions.85 
The different vocabulary used in international law makes re-
course to the relevant body of international legal principles more dif-
ficult. That vocabulary has largely been reserved t(x diplomacy and 
other international discourse, appearing in American judicial opi-
nions only in occasional and rare criminal cases or in quasi-criminal 
proceedings such as antitrust, and then only when the central events 
occurred outside the United States. 86 A close look reveals the utility 
of the international principles in interstate conflicts of legislative ju-
risdiction over possible crime. 
The four traditional headings of jurisdiction to prescribe recog-
nized in international law are:87 the territorial principle; the personal-
ity (or nationality) principle;88 the protective principle; and the un-
ivcrsality principle. 
to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM.). lNT'L L. 57 (2004); joan L. Larsen, ImportinJJ Cmmi-
tutional Nonm from a "Wider CiPilization ": Lawrence and the Rchnquist Court's Use of For-
ei!Jn and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 
(2004 ); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Forward: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 31,90 (2005). 
85. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 2117,2123-25 (1988). 
86. Regarding crimes, see United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968 ), cert. 
denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied sub nom. Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 ( 1968 ). Regarding antitrust, see Con-
tinental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Laker Airways Ltd. v. 
SABENA, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 
416 (2d Cir. 1945 ). Australian Gillian Triggs has expressed considerable doubt about whether 
international standards apply to civil matters. Gillian Triggs, An Intenultiorml Cmtl'c1Jtion on 
SoJJcreign Immunity? Some Problems in Application of t!Je RestrictiJJe Rule, 9 MONASH U. L. 
REV. 74, 96-98 ( 1982 ). Rut see Von Dardd v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) 
(applying the principles of international jurisdiction to a civil case), Pacated 011 other JJrounds, 
736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); 5 MARjORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST Of INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 216-19 (many vols. 1967-1985); 6 WHITEMAN, mpra, at 88-183; Andrew L. Strauss, 
Beyond National Law: The NeJJlected Role of the International Law of Persoru1l Jurisdiction in 
Domestic Courts, 36 HARV.lN"r'LL.J. 373 (1995). 
R7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§§ 402, 404,423 ( 1987). 
88. This principle is usually referred to as the nationality principle, but in order to make 
the import of this principle clear, I prefer the term "personality principle." Phrasing it this way 
makes it unnecessary to develop a supposedly separate principle known as the "passive perso-
nality" principle and shows how this principle actually relates to other principles of legislative 
jurisdiction. For cases listing the passive personality principle as a separate principle, see J'izza-
russo, 388 F.2d at 10 n.5; and Rivard, 375 F.2d at 8R5. See infra pp. 1669-71. 
1666 
1651] Abortion Across State Lines 
1. The territorial principle 
When the territorial principle is invoked because the subject of 
the action in question (in the grammatical sense of the word "sub-
ject") is located within the state at the time of the action, jurisdiction 
to prescribe is accepted everywhere; in tact, "subjective territorial ju-
risdiction" is considered the primary form of jurisdiction to prescribe 
in public law.x9 In contrast, claims of jurisdiction to prescribe be-
cause the object of the action (in the grammatical sense of the word 
"object") is located in the state-that is, when the act occurs outside 
the state but causes a signif1cant effect within the state-arc often 
controversial. 90 "Objective territorial jurisdiction" has nonetheless 
been applied broadly, evoking the greater part of international juris-
dictional controversies. 91 
These controversies arc not actually over the basic concept of ob-
jective territorial jurisdiction, but rather over a narrower class of 
claims to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe. No state disputes a claim 
of jurisdiction when an action abroad causes a serious tangible effect 
in the state claiming legislative jurisdiction. 92 When the effect in the 
forum is intangible or insubstantial, however, other states sometimes 
go to extreme lengths to block the claim of jurisdiction.93 Attempts 
89. See Am. Bamm Co. v. United fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("But the gen-
eral and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawtiJ! must be de-
termined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."); RESTATEMENT (TH!Im) 
Of FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 402(1) ( 1987); Gerhard Kegel & lgnaz Seidi-Hohenvcldern 
(Joseph J. Darby trans.), On the Territorial Principle in Public International Law, 5 HASTINc;s 
I:-;T'L&COMP. L. REV. 245 (1982). 
90. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280,285 (1911) (dictum); United States\'. Ricar-
do, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. I 063 ( 1980); RESTATEMENT 
(THIIU)) Of i'OREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 403 rep. note 3 ( 1987). 
91. See, eB., M.A. Blythe, The Extraterritorial Impact of the Anti-trust Laws: Protecting 
British Trading Interests, 31 AM.). COMP. L. 99 (1983); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the 
Extraterritorial Reach of US. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. I ( 1992); Russell J. Wein-
traub, 17Jc Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the 
Utility ofa "Choice-!if~Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992). 
92. Sec, eB., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); United States 
\'. Columba-Coklla, 604 f.2d 356, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1979). 
93. See, L",q., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 s. 8 (UK) (barring cooper-
ation with the exercise of jurisdiction by American courts in anti-trust cases); Kay Bushman, 
17Jt" British l'rotcctirm of Tradiug Interests Act of 1980: An Analysis, 14 J. I NT'!. L. & Eco". 
253 ( 1980 ). Despite the objections of the British government to U.S. claims to apply objective 
territorial jurisdiction to anti-trust claims, the British have applied their criminal law to crimes 
no more tangibk than attempted fraud where the targeted property was located in England. 
Dir. of Public Prosecutions v. Stonehouse, [1978] A.C. 55 (H.L. 1977); Regina v. Baxter, 
[ 1972 J I Q.B. 1; see also Diamond \. Bank of London & Montreal Ltd., [ 1979] I Q.B. 333. 
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to ameliorate controversy by asserting objective territorial jurisdic-
tion only if an effect was intended by the actor94 have failed to solve 
the problem because they misconstrue its nature. The controversy 
only partly concerns fairness to the defendant; it centers on the clash 
of important social policies between the nation where the action oc-
curred and the nation where the eflect was felt, on the propriety of 
applying the forum state's substantive law to the act.95 Recently, a 
bare majority of the Supreme Court has tended towards asserting na-
tional interest without regard to the concerns of or effects on other 
nations. 96 Other nations, naturally, protest this approach. 97 Whether, 
or the extent to which, the Supreme Court of the United States 
would accept such a unilateralist attitude in assertions of jurisdiction 
between states of the United States is at the least an open question. 98 
2. The nationality/personality principle 
Jurisdiction to prescribe based on the nationality of the actor 
(the "active personality") has long been recognized everywhere. 99 
British courts also have refused to apply their law to fraud in England if the targeted propertv 
was located abroad. Regina v. Governor ofPentonville Prison, 71 Crim. App. 241 (1980); see 
also Juenger, supra note 82. 
94. See Ricardo, 619 F.2d at 1128-29; United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 
F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945). 
95. See Rt:STATEME~T (THIRD) OF FOREIU~ RELATIO~S LAW§§ 403, 414, 415, 416 
(1987); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993). Compare 
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) with British Airways Bd. v. Lak-
er Airways Ltd., [1983]1 Q.B. 142, vacated, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413 (H.L.). See generally Paul 
Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. I~T'L L. 301, 316-19 
(2007) (discussing the clash of policies involved in conflicts between applicable laws and judg-
ments in the international legal system, with particular emphasis on the conflicts created by 
differing laws and policies applicable to the Internet). 
96. See, eg., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99. ("We have no need in this litigation to 
address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of juris-
diction on grounds of international comity."). 
97. For example, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher repeatedly and personally inter-
vened with President Ronald Reagan about the case of Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909, until the 
U.S. government brokered a settlement. See GEOFFREY SMITH, REAGAN A~D THATCHER 141-
44, 164-65 ( 1991 ). See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Jurisdictional Conflict in Global Anti-
trust Enforcement, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 365 (2004); Alexander Layton & Angharad 
M. Parry, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: European Responses, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309 (2004). 
98. See infra pp. 1672-82. 
99. See, eg., State v. Bacon, 112 A. 682, 683 (Del. 1920) (finding a defendant guilty in 
the state of Delaware for a bigamous marriage performed in another state); Hanks v. State, 13 
Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305 (1882) ("We can see no valid reason why the Legislature of the State 
of Texas could not assert ... her jurisdiction over wrongs and crimes ... no matter whether 
the perpetrator of the crime was at the time of its consummation within or without her terri-
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American courts have occasionally applied this principle in state and 
federal prosecutions. 100 If the claim of jurisdiction is based upon the 
nationality of the person acted upon (the "passive personality prin-
ciple"), the claim clearly crosses the line beyond which a claim of ju-
risdiction becomes insupportable. Such claims arc almost universally 
rcjcctcd. 101 Even countries, like France, that routinely assert passive 
personality jurisdiction object vehemently when other countries as-
sert this jurisdiction against them. 102 
For at least a century, the U.S. government consistently opposed 
the passive personality theory .103 One federal court expressly rejected 
toriallimits."); Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 173 (1819) (conferring ju-
risdiction t<>r treason committed out of the state); RESTi\TEMENT (TH!IU)) Of FOREIGN 
RELATio:-;, LAW§ 402(2) (1987); MODE!. PENAl. CODE§§ l.03(l)(f), (2) (1962); SCOLES 
ET AI.., .rupm note 19, at 336-39; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 209-ll; Mark D. Rosen, 
Extrtltaritorialitv 1md Political Hew·olJCiteity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
855, 871-76 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen, ExtrMerritoriality[ ("This is not to suggest that citi-
zenship on its own justifies regulation."); Mark D. Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?: l'osi-
til'c, Normatil'c, and In.rtitutional C!m.ridertltiom of Statc.r' Extraterritorial l'ower.r, 51 ST. 
I.OL'IS U. L.). 713, 719-22 (2007) I hercinati:cr Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" l'lumlism?] 
( "[ C]itizenship on its own has virtuallv suHiced to give the home state sufficient interest to 
regulate its citizens' out-ofstate activities for purposes of the Due Process Clause."). 
100. For c.1ses applying federal law ~o U.S. citizens while abroad, sec Steele v. Bulova 
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 ( 1952 ); and Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433-34 
( 1932). Sec also Stephen Lalxtton, Fischer Is Indicted over Chess Match, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
1992, at A3. l'or cases applying state law to the state's citizens while outside the state, see Ski-
riotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941); Felton v. HodlJeS, 374 l'.2d 337, 339-40 (5th Cir. 
1967); F/V American Eacqle v. State, 620 P.2d 657, 662-63 (Alaska 1980); and People v. Wee-
rw, 607 P.2d 1279, 1285-86 (Cal. 1980). 
101. SeeBenerallyThe SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 
7); RESTATEMENT (THIIU)) OF l'OREIG.:-l RELATIONS LAW§ 402 cmt. e ( 1987); HOWARDS. 
LEVIE, TEIUZORISM I:\ WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 231 (1993) (noting that passive per-
sonality has "long been an extremely controversial principle"); Juenger, supra note 82, at 
1204-05, 1210-11. 
I 02. See Htnenrlly Eric Catritz & Omar Tene, Article 113-7 of the French Penal Code: The 
Passive Personality Principle, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (2003). 
103. See The CuttinlJ Case, 1887 FOR. REL. 751 ( 1888), reported in 2 JOH:\ BASSETT 
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 228 (1906) (asserting that Mexico does not have 
jurisdiction over authors publishing criticisms in U.S. newspapers); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIIm) OF FOREIG:-; RELATIONS LAW § 402 ( 1987); Christopber L. Blakesley, A Conceptual 
Framework j!Jr Extradition and Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 4 UTAH L. REv. 685, 
715 ( 1984) I hereinafter Blakesley, Conceptual Framework] ("The passive personality theory of 
jurisdiction is generally considered to be anathematic to United States law."); Christopher L. 
Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1114-17 ( 1982) [hereinafter Blakesley, Extraterritorial Crime]; Geoff-
rey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. Ixr'L L.J. 1, 4-9 (1993) (discussing 
the evolution of the passive personality principle in the United States). 
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the principle as applicable in the United States. 104 In response to the 
growing problem of international terrorism, however, the executive 
branch embraced the theory of passive personality in the mid-
l980s.105 Subsequently, Congress enacted anti-terrorism statutes that 
appear to be based on the passive personality principle. 106 
Changing executive and legislative attitudes toward the passive 
personality principle have led U.S. courts to apply the passive perso-
nality principle where authorized by statute. 107 Several federal courts 
have recently accepted the legitimacy of the passive personality prin-
ciple in dicta. 108 Whether those courts will apply the principle in oth-
104. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 f.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[T[hat an 
act affects the citizen of a state is not a sutlicient basis for that state to assert jurisdiction over 
the act."); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Eke. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 
1179 n.38 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 723 F2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983 ), rep 'd 011 oth-
er grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
105. Watson, supra note 103, at 9-10 ("During the 1980s the United States continued 
to inch toward passive personality jurisdiction over terrorist crimes."); sec alio Abraham D. So-
faer, Fighting Terrorism throulfh Law, 85 STATE DEP'T BULL. 38,41-42 (1985) (.1rguing fi1r 
greater enforcement measures to be taken against terrorism). See generally Elizabeth Bowen, 
Comment, Jurisdiction over Terrorists Who Take HostaJJes: EjfiJrts to Stop Terror- Violence tl,qaimt 
United States Citizens, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 179-87 ( 1 987). 
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2008) (the Sabotage Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (20081 (the Hos-
tage Taking Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2008) (the Anti-Terrorism Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)17) 
(2008) (the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); see, eg., Christopher C. Jovner, CounteriNg 
Nuclear Terrorism: A Conventional ReJponse, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 225, 239 (2007) ("Though 
passive personality remains controversial, as a jurisdictional principle it applies to terrorism and 
other organized attacks against a state's nationals by reason of their nationality."). Sccgmerally 
S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the Theory and Practice of 
the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148 U. PA. L. RE\'. 1247, 
1264-77 (2000); Bowen, supra note 105, at 198-202 ("The willingness of Congress to in-
clude the passive personality principle of jurisdiction indicates the increasing acceptabilin· of 
the principle's application to international terrorist attacks on civilians because of their n.nio-
nality."). The war on terror has generated more support t(x the application of the passi,·e per-
sonality principle. 
107. United States v. Rezaq, 134 B.3d 1121, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Morin, 80 F.3d 124,126 (4th Cir. 1996). SeeJ!enerallyAbraham Abramovskv, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: The United States' Unwarranted Attempt to Alter Internatioual Law in United 
States v. Yunis, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 121 (1990); Joshua Robinson, Note, United States l'mc-
tice Penalizing International Terrorists Needlessly Undercuts Its Opposition to the PassiPe Paso-
nality Principle, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 487, 500-04 ( 1 998). 
108. See United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419,422 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing in the al· 
ternative that jurisdiction lay over a non -citizen accused of having sex with an underage Amcri-
can citizen even while on a foreign-flag ship on the high seas); United States v. Mau\llister, 
160 F.3d 1304, 1308 n.9 (lith Cir. 1998) (discussing the passive personality as a possible 
alternative ground, but applying territorial jurisdiction); United States v. Bin !.aden, 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 189,221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing passive personality as an alternate holding 
of jurisdiction over a non-citizen accused of bombing U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania); 
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er contexts or whether the executive branch will accept its applica-
tion against the United States remains unclear. 109 The presumption 
that, absent express language to the contrary, acts of Congress are 
intended to have eftect only within the territory of the United States 
is perhaps enough to answer the question in the negative. 110 In in-
ternational terms, the difierent treatment given acts where a claim of 
jurisdiction is based on the location of the effect or on the person af-
fected reflects both the greater likelihood of a defendant being sur-
prised by application of the law of the victim's state (suppose one is 
involved in a traff-Ic accident in the United States with a car that 
turns out to be driven by a French citizen), and the lesser degree of 
intrusion into the interests of a state by an act affecting an absent na-
tional compared to an act intruding into the territory of the state and 
thereby threatening to affect the whole community. 
3. The protective and universality principles 
The last two headings of jurisdiction to prescribe-the protective 
principle and the universality principle-turn upon the nature of the 
act in question rather than on the location of the action or its effect 
or the citizenship of the persons involved. In other words, when an 
act strongly aftects significant interests of a state, the act itself justifies 
a state in exercising jurisdiction regardless of where the act occurs or 
by whom it is done. The protective principle allows jurisdiction over 
acts that threaten the integrity or security of the state itself; examples 
include espionage, counterfeiting, perjury, or interference with go-
United States\'. Roberts, I !:'. Supp. 2d 601, 606-07 (E.D. La. 1998) (discussing in the alter-
n.ltivc that jurisdiction lay ovcr a non-citizcn accused of having sex with an underage American 
citizen c\·cn while on a t(Jreign-tlag ship on the high seas); United States v. Layton, 509 F. 
Supp. 212, 216 n .5 (N.D. Cal. 1981 ) (discussing in the alternative that jurisdiction lay over a 
non-citizen t(Jr the murder of a U.S. congressman at Jonestown, Guyana). 
109. Neely v. Club Mcd Mgmt. Scrvs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 185 n.l7 (3d Cir. !995) (ac-
knowlcdging that thc passive pcrsonalitv principle has not been accepted for ordinary torts or 
crimcs); Unitcd Statcs \'.Vasquez-Velasco, 15 !:'.3d 833,841 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); In re 
Ahmad, 726 F Supp. 389, 398-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (accepting application of the passive per-
sonality principlc when asserted by a t()reign state as a basis for extradition), aff'd on other 
,qrotmds, 910 1:'.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Extradition of Demjanjuck, 612 F. Supp. 544, 
SS8 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (alternative holding); see Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdictimt and tile Failure of the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 21 
H..'Sll~GS [~T'L & COMP. L. REV. 177, 204-07 ( 1997). 
II 0. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-41 
( 1989) 
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vernmental operations. 111 The universality principle allows jurisdic-
tion over acts so universally viewed as heinous that the actor is sub-
ject to punishment by any state that obtains custody of the actor, al-
though arguably the law to be applied is international law rather than 
the law of any particular state. 112 Controversy is also characteristic of 
such claims of jurisdiction. In accepting or opposing these extraterri-
torial forms of jurisdiction, a state must balance the achievement of 
its own or other states' substantive policies against the risk of surprise 
in exercising jurisdiction over people acting abroad in the reasonable 
belief that they can be held accountable only under the law of the 
state where they act or of which they are citizens, in a forum to 
which they have signif!cant ties. 113 
lll. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIG~ RELATIO~S LAW§ 402(3) (1987); Estey, JZt-
pra note 109, at 199-204; see lAIN CAtV!ERON, THE PROTECTIVE P!UNCIPLE OF 
l~TERNATIO~AL CRIMINAL )U!USDICTION passim (1994); see also, eg., Strassheim v. Daily, 
221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and 
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if 
he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power."); 
United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811-12 (4th Cir. 1972) (applying the protective prin-
ciple to uphold jurisdiction over a person who falsified official documents outside thc prosecut-
ing jurisdiction); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 196X) (holding that 
the perjurious statements by an alien before a United States consular otlicer in a tixeign coun-
try constitute a pursuable crime). 
112. Regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes against peace, see Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277 ( 1948 ); Ch.1rter of 
the International Military Tribunals, 59 STAT. 1544 ( 1945 ); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I, 12-
14 (1946); Daliberti v. Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2000); Attorney-General v. 
Eichmann, 36 l.L.R. 277, 287-98 (Israel 1962 ). Regarding air or sea piracy, sec 49 U.S. C. §§ 
1301(31\), 1472; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
A1·iation, opened .fi!r .r(qnature Sept. 23, 1971, entered into .fi!ret: .fiw the U.S. Jan. 26, 1973, 24 
UST 564, TIAS no. 7570 (1973); Convention tix the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure ofAir-
cratt, opwed filrs~qnature Dec. 16, 1970, entered into fi!rce for the U.S. Oct. 14, 1971, 22 LIST 
1641, TIAS no. 7192 ( 1971 ); Convention on the High Seas, arts. 14-22, opened fin· .rijptature 
April 29, 1958, mtered into force .fiw the U.S. Sept. 30, 1962, 13 UST 2312, TIAS no. 5200, 
450 UNTS 82 ( 1962 ). Regarding attacks on diplomats, sec 18 U.S. C. §§ 11 16, 120 I ( 2008 1; 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationallv Protected 
Persons, opened .for .rzqnature Dec. 14, 1973, entered into .fi!rce for the U.S. ~cb. 20, 1977, 2il 
LIST 1975, TIAS no. 8532 (1977); Von Darcie! v. USSR, 623 ~- Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 
1985), vacated on other"qround.r, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); [AN 11ROWNLIE, PRINCIPLE~ 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 307-08 (5th cd. 1998); Estey, supra note 109, at 195-99. 
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 01' ~OREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 ( 1987); STEPHEN 
MACEDO ET AI.., THE PRI;o;:CF.TON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURI,DICTION (200] ); Jon B. 
Jordan, Universal Juri.rdiction ill a Dangerous World: A Weaprm .for All Natimti A.trainst litter-
national Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. J. lNT'L L. 1 (2000). 
113. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-95 (19X0); 
Kulko \'.Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84,92-98 (1978); Shafter v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,207-09, 
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The principles that delineate jurisdiction to prescribe in the in-
ternational arena have been applied in U.S. courts in appropriate cas-
es.114 There is little precedent for applying these principles to resolve 
the legislative jurisdiction of state courts intent on enforcing their 
criminal laws. Yet the fact is that most traditional rules and principles 
of cont1icts of law applied in interstate settings in the United States 
were derived from the analogous rules and principles applied interna-
tionally.m These principles directly address whether a court has ju-
risdiction to apply its own law to an alleged crime-precisely the 
problem courts confront in determining whether to try a criminal 
case that has significant extraterritorial elements. Instead of relying 
on these principles, American courts have sought to resolve these 
questions through application of various provisions of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 116 These international principles could be 
used even more widely because they do not contradict the holdings 
of the interstate cases, but supplement them in a way that could cla-
rity the often confusing and uncertain language of such decisions. 
E. Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law 
Several constitutional provisions play a role in shaping or limiting 
state (and possibly other) choice of law rules or principles. The pri-
mary constitutional provisions that limit state choices of law are the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, 117 the Due Process Clause, llS and the 
Commerce Clause. 119 Space does not allow an extended analysis of 
these provisions, but one must have some minimal familiarity with 
214-16 (1977); sec also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 403, 
421(1), 431(1) (1987). 
114. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968); Rivard v. United 
States, 375 F.2d 882,885 (5th Cir. 1967). 
115. Sec SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 18-22. Compare Justice Holmes' discussion of 
the theory of "obli_qatio" in Slater P. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 ( 1904 ), with 
the theories in Alabama GreatS. R.R. P. Carroll, ll So. 803, 805-09 (Ala. 1892). Compare 
also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,405-07 (1930), with N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 
246 U.S. 357, 375-77 ( 1918). See generally Cavers, supra note 51, at 177; Harold P. Souther-
land, SoJJerei_qntv, Value Juc{qmeuts, and Choice of LaJv, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 451 ( 2000) (explain-
ing the gradual changes from more independent sovereign states that based relationships on 
more international principles, to the more interdependent states of today but with the same 
relationship structure). 
116. Sec iufra pp. 1673-82. 
117. Sccinfrapp. 1674-79. 
118. Secinjrapp.l679-82. 
l!Y. Su inji-a pp. 1688, 16<)1-93. 
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these provisions to understand whether a state could apply its laws in 
civil or criminal litigation to abortions that occur outside the state. 
If a choice must be made between the laws of different states in 
the United States, the Constitution appears to address the problem 
directly in the Full Faith and Credit Clause: "Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." 120 The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause docs little to constrain the free-wheeling choice of 
law process as a matter of state law. Today, the clause rarely will dic-
tate a choice among the laws of those states or prohibit certain 
choices oflaw. 
Early in the twentieth century, after more than a century of neg-
lect, the Supreme Court did begin to find particular choices man-
dated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 121 The Court construed 
the command to give each state "full faith and credit" to the "public 
acts" of every other state as a requirement that state courts must ap-
ply the law of the state that the Court deemed appropriate. Despite 
recurring challenges to the historical accuracy of the theory, the 
Court continues to accept it. 122 Yet the Court is divided over \vhen 
120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. Congress has implemented this provision through 2X 
U.S.C. § 1738 (2008). When the choice is between state or t(:dcral law, the governing prmi-
sion is the supremacy clause: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thercot; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
121. Sec Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, S40-47 (I 'liS); 
W. Union Tel. Co. v·. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1'114); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S 
243, 2S8-61 (1'112). Rutiee Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1'127); Union 
Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 417 (1'118); Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 
(1'!16) (treating choice of law as a question purdv of state law). 
122. All eight participating justices endorsed this proposition in both Phillips l'ttro!. Co. 
1'. Shutts, 472 U.S. 7'!7, 818 (1985), and in Allstate Ins. Co. 1'. Hacquc, 449 U.S 302, 312 13 
( 19X I). ~or historical criticism, see ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MFHRcS & DO:-.JALll P. 
T!v\UTMAN, THE LAW Of MULTI STATE l'ROIH.EMS 1223-30 ( 1965 ); Kurt H. Nadclmann, 
Full Faith and Credit to Jut{qments and l'ublic Acts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, SS-RO ( 1'!57). Bill 
Crosskey asserted that the requirement of "full ftith and credit" to "records" is the source of 
the obligation of each state to apply the law of atwther state. W!Ll.lAM W. CROSSKH, 
Poi.ITICS A~D THF Co~sTITUTION 545-47 (1953). Others challenge the historical accur,tcv 
of this view. Sec Nadclmann, supra, at 44, 66. Crosskey's view at least deals with the problem 
of how a mandate to respect the "public acts" (apparently statutes) of another state comes to 
be a mandate to respect another state's common law. This last problem has ne\Tr been dectlt 
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states are compelled to apply the law of other states and how to se-
lect the appropriate state law that must be applied. 
The early cases seemed to enshrine the vested rights approach 123 
in the Constitution, the proper application of which would be en-
sured by the Supreme Court's supervision of state choices of law. 
Contracts were held to be governed by the law of the state in which 
they were made; 124 torts by the law of the state where the injury oc-
curred;125 and the internal atlairs of corporations by the law of the 
place of incorporation. 126 These decisions evoked scathing criticism 
from many as overly rigid and arbitrary, 127 and the Court eventually 
abandoned this approach. 
The vested-rights approach to ftlll faith and credit was predicated 
on the assumption that for any given transaction or event there was 
one, and only one, body of law that could properly be applied. If this 
assumption had continued, none of the modern experiments in 
choice of law theories could have been possible. The Supreme Court 
repudiated this assumption in two cases in the 1930s. 128 The Court, 
in opinions by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, decided that worker's 
compensation could be governed both by the law of the state where 
the contract of employment was made and by the law of the state 
where the employee was injured. Through these cases, the Supreme 
Court made it clear that the law of any significantly interested state 
could be applied regardless of whether it was the most significantly 
with adequately by proponents of the "public acts" theory. See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMA:-:, 
wpm, at 124:i-44; Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Con-
stitutirm, 45 C:OLUI\1. L. REV. I, 12 (1945); Nadelmann, supra, at 71-80; Ralph U. Whitten, 
The Constitutional Limitations 011 State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEMPHIS ST. 
L RFV. I, 56-60 ( 1981 ). 
123. Seesupmpp. 1658-59. 
124. Sec John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936); Bradford 
Elcc. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. I45, 154-55 ( 1932). 
125. See W. Uuion Td. Co., 234 U.S. 542. 
126. Sa Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 606-08 ( 1947); 
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-45 ( 1935 ); Supreme Council of Roval Arcanum v. 
Green, 2:i7 U.S. 5:il, 543-44 ( 1915); Com•erse, 224 U.S. 243; finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335, 
:i40-42 (1903). 
127. See SCOLES ET AL., Jttpra note 19, at 145-69; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 290; 
jackson, mpra note 122, at 26-28. 
128. Sec Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-01 ( 1939), 
oFcrruli1ta Bradford Elcc. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. 
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532,544,550 (1935). 
1675 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
interested. 12Y In other words, full faith and credit serves only to pro-
hibit a court from applying the law of a state that has "no legitimate 
interest in its application. " 130 
Because of the Supreme Court's current narrow construction of 
the Full faith and Credit Clause, choice among the laws of several 
interested states is left to each state to decide tor itself. In short or-
der, the Court swept aside virtually all the older cases announcing a 
constitutionally compelled choice of a particular state's law. 131 The 
only state choice of law decision reversed by the Supreme Court be-
tween 1939 and 1985 involved the internal affairs of a fraternal ben-
efit society, 132 and even this reversal has been questioned by well-
regarded scholars. 133 Even an apparent attempt by Congress to re-
store the pre-19 39 view that full faith and credit mandated applica-
tion of the single "proper law" to any given case 134 t:1ilcd to reverse 
129. See also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412--13 ( 1955 ); Watson v. Employers' Liab. 
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-74 (1954 ). 
130. CURRIE, supra note 53, at 271. 
131. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Otlice, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181 (1964); Carroll, 349 U.S. at 
408; Watson, 348 U.S. at 66; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Hoo-
peston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1942). 
132. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624-25 ( 1947). 
One might add the escheat cases, but these im·oh'ed original actions in the Supreme Court 
between states for which federal common law better explains the outcome than ti.Iil bith and 
credit. See also Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 ( 1972 ); Texas\' New jersey, 379 U.S. 
674 (1965); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at ]59 n.l8; WEINTRAllll, mpm note 19, at 637 
n.73, 665; Willis L.M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: '171e Dcfmsc of" Public l'olicv, 19 
U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 342 (1952). 
133. See, e,q., WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 665-68. Many critics .lttempt to limit the 
decision by viewing it as applying only to fraternal benefit societies rather than to all corpor.l-
tions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF C:ONHJCT OF LAWS introductorY note to C:h. 13 
( 1971 ); SCOI.F.S ET AI.., mprt! note 19, at 159 n.l8, 1102-03 n.l; Willis l..M. Reese & Ed-
mund M. Kaufi1nn, The Law Gove,·ninH Corporate Af]ilirs: Choia of Law aud the Impact of Full 
Faith and Credit, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1131 (1958). Some have ch.lllcnged the vinv 
that there is a broader "internal athirs" rule applicable to all corporations. Sa \Nilson v. 
La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 859-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Vo:-; MEHRE~ & 
TRAUTMA~, supra note 122, at 1248-52; WEINTRAUB, supm note 19, .1t 670-71 n.228; Elvin 
Latty, Pseudo-Fore~qn Corporations, 65 YALE L.). 137, 143-45 (1955). Sec HCiltTtdly John 
Hugh Newman, Note, The Pseudo-Forei_qn Corporation in Califiwnia, 2R H.-\STI~t;s L.). 119 
( 1976 ). The Supreme Court, however, has recontinned the "internal athirs" rule at lcc1st in 
dictum. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 ( 1982 ); Regan, sup•·a note ?R, at 1875-
76. 
134. Congress added "public acts" to the stcltute prescribing the nunner and effect of ti.dl 
faith and credit in 1948. 62 STAT. 94 7, codified at 28 U .S.C. § 173R ( l94R ). Bet(HT 1948, the 
statute required ti.J!l E1ith and credit only f(x "records and judicial proceedings." Sec 28 U.S.C: 
§ 687 ( 1940). Some have suggested this addition is controlling. Sa Carroll, .'149 LTS. at 422 
(Frankfurter,)., dissenting); Hughes\'. l:'etter, 341 U.S. 609,613-14 n.l6 ( !951 ). Note that 
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the Supreme Court's abandonment of responsibility for policing 
state choices of law. 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, m the Court surprised nearly 
everyone by agreeing to hear its first full faith and credit challenge to 
a state choice of law in seventeen years. Although all eight of the par-
ticipating Justices agreed that full faith and credit continued to con-
strain state-to-state choice of law, they split three ways on the appro-
priate standards and on whether the standards, whatever they were, 
had been violated. The Minnesota Supreme Court had applied its 
own law to the suit because it was the "better rule"-even though 
no substantial interest of Minnesota was implicated, and even though 
no relevant policy of Minnesota law would be advanced through its 
application. 136 Only three Justices were persuaded, however, that 
Minnesota had applied the law of a state with no substantial inter-
est.137 A plurality of four Justices apparently renounced the require-
ment of a substantial interest in the state whose law was chosen. 138 
Rather, they found it adequate that Minnesota had "substantial con-
tacts" with the litigation even though those contacts did not relate 
to the policies of the law that was applied. Most troubling about this 
plurality opinion was that the four Justices themselves noted that 
each of the contacts by itself was essentially irrelevant to choice of 
the proper law. 139 Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, did not 
even attempt to explain how three individually irrelevant contacts 
add up to a "significant aggregation of contacts. " 140 
the majoritv in Carroll simply disregarded Justice Frankfurter's argument. Generally the addi· 
tion has been viewed as both vague and more or less accidental. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 
19, at 680-82; Herbert F. Goodrich, Yieldin._q Place to New: Rest Versus Motion iu the Conflict 
ofl.llll'J, 50 COLCM. L. REV. 881,891 (1950); Whitten, supra note 122, at 60-62. 
135. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
136. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 289 N.W.2d 43, 48-49 (Minn. 1978), ajf'd, 449 U.S. 
302 (1981). 
137. Sec Al!Jtau, 449 U.S. at 332-40 (Powell,]., dissenting with Berger, C.]., & Rehn· 
quist, J. ). 
138. Sec id . . n 305-20 (Brennan, T., plurality opinion with Bbckmun, Marshall, & White, 
JJ) 
139. See id. at 313-20. 
140. Id. at 320. This dcficicncv was noted by the dissent. See id. at 339-40 (Powell,]., 
dissenting with Berger, C.)., & Rehnquist, ].). It also explains the generally hostile reception 
the opinion received among conflicts scholars. See, eg., SCCll J:.s ET AI .. , suprtl note 19, at 150-
54; WFI~TRAl!B, supra note 19, at 626-31, 635-37; Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in 
Multistate l'mblems: As Between State aud Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (1981); 
Roose\Tit, supra note 50, at 2505-16, 2528-34; W. Clark Williams, Jr., 17Je Impact 1if Allstate 
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Justice John Paul Stevens, in an individual concurrence, found 
no violation of full faith and credit because he saw no attack on Wis-
consin's sovereignty from application of Minnesota law to the case-
although he expressly declared that Minnesota's use of its own law 
was wrong as a matter of sound choice of law theory. 141 Just how far 
Stevens' approach could take a court is illustrated in Nevada v. 
Hall, 142 where California was not only allowed to apply its own law 
to determine the extent, if any, of Nevada's sovereign immunity for 
an accident in California involving an employee of the state of Neva-
da, but the Court dismissed in a footnote any restraint derived from 
the mutual respect due between coequal sovereigns. 
Fairness to the defendant hardly seemed to count for more in the 
approaches supported by the majority Justices. They were content to 
dismiss claims of unfairness by the question begging observation that 
a defendant doing business in a forum cannot be surprised by appli-
cation of the forum's law given modern choice of law theories. 14" 
This observation not only assumes the general acceptance of the 
standard being challenged, it also assumes unfair surprise is the only 
unfairness to be considered. One might almost conclude, therefore, 
that fairness is simply irrelevant to full faith and credit analysis. 
Only four years later, the Supreme Court, by a seven-to-one 
vote, resurrected full faith and credit as a limit on permissible state 
choice of law without, however, providing any greater certainty 
about its application. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 144 in an opi-
nion by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that Kansas' deci-
sion to apply its own law to a class action in which ninety-seven per-
cent of the class members were neither residents of Kansas, nor had 
any contact with Kansas, was a violation of full faith and credit and 
due process. Perhaps in order to avoid fractionalizing the Court as 
happened in Allstate, Justice Rehnquist provided no more precise 
explanation for his decision than that it was "arbitrary" or "funda-
Insurance Co. \'. Hague on Constitutional Limitations on Choice of' Law, 17 U. RICH. I .. REV. 
489,503-06(1983). 
141. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 324 (SteYens, J., concurring). 
142. 440 U.S. 410,424 n.24 (1979); see also Thomas\'. Wash. l}as Light Co., 448 U.S. 
261, 279-86 ( 1980); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 440, 456-60 ( 1982). 
143. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 317-18 (Brennan,}., plurality opinion, with Bbckmun, 
Marshall, & White, JJ.), 322-26 (Stevens,}., concurring). 
144. 472 U.S. 797,815,818 (1985). 
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mentally unfair." 145 His only attempt to define "fairness" was to note 
that an "important element is the expectations of the parties. " 146 Jus-
tice Stevens dissented on the same grounds as he concurred in 
Allstate. 147 The Kansas Supreme Court then somewhat implausibly 
fc)Und that the law of the other interested states was the same as that 
of Kansas, and so applied its own law. 148 Curiously, when that case 
reached the Supreme Court under the name of Sun Oil Co. v. Wort-
man, 14~ only Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist found a 
willful distortion of the laws of other states to be a violation of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 150 
Justice Robert Jackson, sixty years ago, best summarized where 
these cases leave us: "[W]e [the Supreme Court] will adopt no rule, 
permit a good deal of overlapping and confusion, but interfere now 
and then, \Vithout imparting to the bar any reason by which the one 
or the other course is to be guided or predicted. " 151 After Allstate, 
Nevada v. Hall, and Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, it is difficult to im-
agine a case in which a state court's decision to apply the forum's law 
could be held unconstitutional, and yet lower courts continue to do 
so, 152 at least occasionally, and scholars continue to ponder what it all 
means, with little success. 153 
145. Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312-13). 
146. Id. at 822. 
147. See id. at 823-45. 
148. Wortman v. Sun Oil Co., 755 P.2d 488,490-93 (Kan. 1987), ajj'd, 486 U.S. 717, 
722-30 (1988). 
149. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
150. !d. at 743-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, with Rchnquist, C.J.). 
151. Jackson, supra note 122, at 27. At the time, Jackson apparently thought this state of 
atlairs was about the best we could hope tor. See id. at 26-28 (discussing various options for 
Supreme Court choice of law jurisprudence; none of the options providing clear guidance). 
Jackson did have second thoughts and later advocated a more aggressive role t(Jr the Supreme 
Court in policing state choice of law. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 
AMERICAN SYSTEM 01' GOVER..c'-'MENT41-44 (1955). 
152. See, eg., McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1901), ajj'd 
man., 454 U.S. 1071 (1981); De Roburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574,581-83 (D. Haw. 
1979), dismissed on other lfrourtdJ, 548 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Haw. 1982), dismiJJal rev'd, 733 
F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 570-72 
( 1996) (dictum). 
153. Seccqenerally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 145-69; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, 
at 656-82; Brilmayer, supra note 140; Roosevelt, supra note SO, at 2509-10; Symposium, 
Choice of Law: HoJV It Oucqht to Be, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 623 ( 1997); Weinberg, supra note 142; 
\Vhittcn, supra note 122. 
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The major alternative to full faith and credit on choice of law is 
the Due Process Clauses. 154 Due process as a constraint on choice of 
law exactly parallels full faith and credit. For a time, Justice John 
Paul Stevens campaigned to develop a distinction between due 
process and full faith and credit as limitations on choice of law. 155 He 
argued that due process is a question of fairness, while full bith and 
credit is concerned with the mutual respect due between coequal so-
vereigns (federalism). 156 His theory has had considerable appeal to 
scholars. 157 A few lower courts even picked up this distinction. 158 Yet 
every other sitting justice has rejected it. 15~ In recent years, Justice 
Stevens has not had the opportunity to review his position. There 
appears to be no basis for challenging the continued equivalence of 
the two major constitutional constraints on choice of law. 
Due process as a constitutional command applies to both state 
and federal exercises of power. 160 Unlike full faith and credit, due 
process is not limited to incorrect choices of law among states of the 
United States, but rather seeks to limit arbitrary or irrational applica-
tions of government power. Due process thus can require the appli-
cation of the law of a foreign nation just as it might require the ap-
plication of the law of a state of the United States. 161 As Allstate 
shows, the Supreme Court has consistently considered fairness and 
federalism under both due process and full faith and credit. The 
Court, in announcing due process limits in other contexts, has also 
154. U.S. CONST. amends. V; XIV,§ 1. 
155. Allstate, Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,837-45 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320-32 ( 1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); see also Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611-13 ( 1951 ). 
156. 449 U.S. at 320-23. 
157. See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2506-07; Ralph U. Whitten, The Cowtitu-
tional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Due Process, 9 HASTI:\IGS CO :\I ST. L.Q. 851, 906-10 
(1982). 
158. Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 856-58, 861-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1982); Harlow v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 184 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Me. 1984 ); Scvcrinc v. Ford 
Aerospace and Commc'ns Corp., 325 N.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (dictum). 
159. Seven of eight participating justices agreed that the standards tc)r due process for 
choice of law are the same as the standards for full faith and credit. Phillips Petroleum Co. \'. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-22 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10, 
333 ( 1981 ); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729-30 n.3 ( 1988); Cby v. Sun 
Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181 (1964). 
160. U.S. CONST. amends. V (the federal government); XIV,§ I (state governments). 
161. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930) (the law of Mexico); Am. 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (the law of Costa Rica); Slater\'. Mex-
ican Nat'! R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (the law of Mexico). 
1680 
l6Sl] Abortion Across State Lines 
been concerned about both fairness and federalism, although it now 
seems to discount federalism as a concern in judicial jurisdiction cas-
es.t~>2 
Due process precludes a state from choosing a law not based on 
legislative jurisdiction over the transaction or event163 in much the 
same manner as it precludes a state from trying a case if the court 
does not have judicial jurisdiction (jurisdiction to adjudicate) over 
the case. 1M The Supreme Court initially gave content to legislative 
jurisdiction by resorting to the vested rights approach to choice of 
law. 16' As most of the early cases involved insurance contracts, some 
saw in this the mere application of now discredited notions of eco-
nomic substantive due process. 166 That view was not accurate. Con-
sistent opponents of economic substantive due process wrote many 
of the due process cases on choice of law. 167 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court never fully repudiated the due process limits on choice 
of Lnv long after it repudiated economic substantive due process. 168 
But with the standard for due process being the same as for full faith 
162. Ins. Corp. of Ireland\'. Compagnie des Banxitcs de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,702-03 
(I 9X2 I. llut sec Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1 985 ); Rush v. Sa\'· 
chuk, 444 U.S. 320,332 I 19XO). 
163. Sec Home I11s. Co., 2XI U.S. at 407-08; Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gal-
lagher, 267 f'.3d 1228, 1236-40 (lith Cir. 2001 ); JU also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
C:O:-\f'l]( T OF LA\\'S § 4 ( 19X7). SalfCIUTafly SCOLES ET AI.., supra note 19, at 147-55, 160-
6X; W!-JNTR:\l'B, sufn·a note 19, at 631-35; Reese, mpm note 81. 
164. Asahi Metal Indus. Co.\'. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Hdicopteros Nacio-
!1.1lcs de Colombia, SA \'. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 ( 1984 ); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S 2X6 ( 1980). 
165. See .rupm p. I 659. 
166. The \'Cf\' first economic substantive due process case was in fact a choice of law case. 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 
299 US. 178 ( 1936 ); Home lw. Co., 281 U.S. 397; Mut. Lite Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 
209 (1922); ;..J.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); N.Y. Lite Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 
178 U.S. 389 (1900). 
167. justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., well known lor his dissent from economic subs· 
tantive due process in Lochner l'. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 ( 1905) (Holmes, J,, dissent· 
ing), wrote the Court's opinion in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 
( 1909 ). Similarly, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote the Court's opinions in Home Insurance Co. v. 
Die/<, 281 U.S. 397 ( 1930 ), and Bradji1rd Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 155-60 
( 1932 ), applying full l:1ith and credit, in contrast to his views on economic substantive due 
process that he expressed as early as Kryger v. Wilmn, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916) (Brandeis,)., 
dissenting). 
168. Contrast the rcaltirmation of due process as a check on choice of law in Phillips Pe· 
trolcum Co. l'. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-22, 837-42 (1985), and Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307-20, 326-·31, 333-36 (1981), with the formal, final repudiation of 
economic substantive due process in Fezquson l'. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,730 (1963). 
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and credit, the standard has eroded to the point of virtual insig-
nificance. 169 Due process as a limitation on choice of law, like full 
faith and credit, has practically died, and its use is likely to be similar-
ly intermittent and unpredictable. Only a reversal of field by the Su-
preme Court to begin aggressive policing of the choices of law made 
by lower courts could make either due process or full faith and credit 
an important limitation on choice of law. While several other clauses 
in the Constitution might also shape choices made under state law, 170 
those other clauses have only rarely been used in litigation, and their 
usc has usually been subsumed within the more commonly used 
clauses. 171 
Ill. ABORTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 
The Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey/72 adopted an "undue burden" standard that prom-
ised to allow, for the first time in twenty years, major variations 
among the states in their laws regarding abortion. Several conflicts 
scholars soon began to address how courts should resolve the con-
flicts that were now predicted between the laws of different states. 17.J 
Conflicts can arise between the laws of different states in as many dif.. 
fercnt ways as the laws regarding abortion are allowed to vary-and 
they are being allowed to vary in ever greater ways. 
169. But see Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F3d 1228, 1236-40 
(II th Cir. 200 I) (tin ding that florida's attempt to regulate European insurance companies 
violates due process because of a lack of legislative jurisdiction). 
170. For examples under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c I. 3, sec Ec{qar 
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 ( 1982 ); and Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 
Ltd., 336 U.S. 386 (1949). For an example under the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Co:--;sT. 
amend. XIV, § I, see Skahill v. Capitol Airlines, 234 f. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964 ). for an 
example under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2 & amend. XIV, 
see Grovey v. Washington National Insurance Co., 119 S.W.2d 503 (Ark. 1938). Although 
corporations arc "persons" under the fourteenth Amendment, they arc not "citizens" and 
thus are not protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Asbury Hosp. v. C:ass County, 
326 u.s. 207,211-13 (1945). 
171. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 169-76. See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 
19, at 682-86. 
172. 505 U.S. 833,837 (1992). 
173. C. Steven Bradford, What Happens if Roe is Overruled? E"<traterritorial Regulation 
of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 87 (1993); Seth F. Kreimer, "Rut Whoel'er Treamrn 
Freedom . . . ": The Right to TraPel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REv. 907 
( 1993) [hereinafter Kreimer, Right to Travel]; Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice a1td Choice 
ofLww: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Re.!Jttlation in American Fcdtralism, 
67 N .Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992) [hereinafter Kreimer, The Law of Choice]. 
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vVe arc not yet to the point where abortion might be prohibited 
in one state (with few or no exceptions) and allowed virtually at the 
demand of a pregnant woman in another, but further legal develop-
ments could make that possible. Such a stark difference will present a 
conflict in the criminal laws should a state that prohibits abortion 
seek to preclude its citizens (meaning its residents174 ) by prosecuting 
them upon their return from an abortion in a permissive state. 17s It 
would also pose a conflict in the civil laws should the state seek to 
enjoin a woman or girl or those aiding the woman or girl from going 
to a more permissive state to obtain an abortion, 176 or should inter-
ested persons (such as the father) seek to recover damages from 
abortion providers in the permissive state. Leaving a state to obtain 
an abortion has been called abortion tourism. 177 
While the conflicts are perhaps less severe, the same questions 
can arise when differences are more subtle; for example, where one 
state requires parental notice or consent for a minor seeking an abor-
tion and the other state does not. 178 One can multiply the potential 
conflicts with many other examples. In the remainder of this section, 
I shall examine the conflicts in the starkest terms-prohibition of 
abortion versus legalized abortion. I do so because such a stark con-
flict serves to clarify the issues and because lesser levels of cont1ict will 
be resolved according to the same legal principles. 
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ l. 
175. Sa supra pp. 1651-53. The German government has taken steps to enforce its fairly 
restrictive abortion laws against German women who travel to the Netherlands to obtain an 
abortion that would have been illegal in Germany, even including gynecological exams for 
women returning from trips to the Netherlands. Karen Y. Crabbs, The German Abortion De-
bate: Stumbling Block to Unity, 6 FLA. ) . lNT'L L. 213, 222-23 ( 1991 ); Kreimer, Right to Tra-
Pcl, supra note 173, at 908 n.5; Nina Bernstein, Germany Still Divided on Abortion, NEWSDAY, 
Mar. 11, 1991, at 5. 
176. Senuprapp. 1651-52. 
177. See Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions? No Thanks: A Response to Professors 
Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 MICH. L. REV. 939,942 (1993). Professor Neuman would distin-
guish between a state citizen who travels solely for the purpose of obtaining an abortion and a 
state citizen who has a prolonged presence in another state (perhaps as a student) and who 
becomes pregnant and has an abortion while in the second state. Id. It is possible that courts 
would make a similar distinction. Abortion tourism in the strict sense has a long history. See 
DELLAPE:-.JNA, supra note 15, at 572-73,585,596-97,624,626,710,725. Abortion tourism 
is a subset of the broader phenomenon of medical tourism. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Un-
der-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tourism and Outmurcing, 29 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421 (2007). 
178. SecJuprapp.1652-53. 
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A. Criminal Conflicts 
There seem to be few, if any, cases in which a state has attempted 
to apply its criminal laws to prosecute someone based upon an abor-
tion that occurred outside the state. Even the Rose Marie Hartford 
case discussed at the opening of this Article did not involve prosecut-
ing Ms. Hartford for the abortion as such, but for interfering with 
the custody of a child by transporting a girl out of the state without 
the permission of the parent or guardian of the minor. 179 The interfe-
rence occurred, at least initially, within Pennsylvania-the state that 
prosecuted and convicted Ms. Hartford. New Jersey is not likely to 
extradite the physician who performed the abortion or other persons 
working in the abortion clinic where the abortion was performed. It 
is possible that the physician or other staff could simply be arrested 
upon entering Pennsylvania or another state seeking to apply its 
criminal law to an abortion in another state, 180 although this would 
suppose a level of scrutiny of persons who enter or leave a state that 
is unlikely in practice. 
If a prosecution is to be brought for an abortion in another state, 
it is not likely to be against the abortion tourist herself-a woman 
resident in the state who has gone to another state to obtain an 
abortion that would have been illegal if performed within the 
state. 181 Instead, the prosecution would likely be against another per-
son (like Ms. Hartford) who facilitated the out-of-state abortion and 
who therefore might be indicted as an accomplice to the crime of, or 
committed against, the abortion tourist. 182 A state could avoid many 
of the arguments about the extraterritorial application of its laws by 
making it a crime for a woman resident in a state to leave the state in 
order to obtain an abortion, or to facilitate such a woman's leaving 
the state in order to obtain an abortion. As with Ms. Hartford, the 
179. See supra pp. 1651-52. 
180. In one very old case, the state court rejected an attempt to do so. Edge v. State, 99 
S.W. 1098, 1099 (Tenn. 1907). 
181. Traditionally a woman who underwent an illegal abortion was not guilry of a crime 
even under the most restrictive abortion laws. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 240-41, 
299-302, 327, 544-45. Whether this would continue to be true if Roe were overruled remains 
to be seen. 
182. Butsee People v. Butfum, 256 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1953) (rejecting an attempt to 
prosecute a person who aided women in California to find Mexican abortionists on grounds 
that the relevant statute required at least an attempt to commit the crime within the state). See 
Bradford, supra note 173, at 99-100. 
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crime would occur within the state and there would be no question 
about criminal jurisdiction. 183 
The troubling question lurking in all of this is whether prosecut-
ing someone for an abortion that occurred in another state under an 
expansive reading of the territorial principle or of the personality (na-
tionality) principle would violate constitutional limitations on choice 
of law. This is not a question that can be answered simply by apply-
ing cases decided regarding choice of law in civil litigation, although 
several commentators have attempted to apply those precedents to 
the criminal law question. 184 One must instead consider precedents 
regarding criminal prosecutions, and there are only a few. 
The case most nearly on point regarding doctors who perform 
abortions in pro-choice states on residents from pro-life states is 
NiclJen v. Oregon. 1 ~" In this case, now nearly a century old, the Su-
preme Court overturned a conviction for fishing in the Columbia 
River in violation of an Oregon statute. The Columbia River, at the 
point in question, forms the boundary of Oregon and Washington, 
and Congress had enacted that the two states should each have con-
current jurisdiction over all crimes committed anywhere on the riv-
er.186 The defendant was a Washington resident who was arrested by 
Oregon oflicers while fishing on the Washington side of the river in a 
manner that was not only legal under the laws of Washington, but 
had in fact been licensed by the state of Washington. The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that either state could, pursuant to the act of 
Congress, prosecute a crime prohibited by the law of both states re-
gardless of the citizenship of the defendant and regardless of where 
the crime was committed, 187 but held that Oregon could not prose-
cute an act committed in Washington under a license from that 
state. 188 The Court did not indicate the precise basis for its holding. 
183. See Bradford, supra note 173, at 97-98. On criminal jurisdiction based on the 
commission of a crime (the territorial principle) or the citizenship of the culprit (the personali-
ty principle), sec supra pp. 1667-71. 
184. SeeJ7enerally Appleton, supra note 37, at 667-77; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federalism 
Doctrines and Abortion Cases: A ReJponse to Professor Fallon, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 767, 771-
75, 791-95 (2007); Bradford, supra note 173, at 109-26, 129-30; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If 
Roe were Orerruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOl!lS U. L.J. 
611, 626-32 (2007); Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 477-87; Neuman, supra 
note 177, .lt 940-52; Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 728-29. 
185. 212 U.S. 315 (1909). 
186. Jd.at316. 
187. Id. at 320. 
188. Id. at 321. 
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Presumably, the Court reached its decision because Oregon lacks 
legislative jurisdiction over the act in question. IHY 
Nielsen v. Oregon precludes prosecution of a physician or other 
person licensed by the state where the abortion occurs to perf()[m or 
facilitate an abortion in a different state where abortion is a crime. It 
does not, however, reach the question of whether a state could pros-
ecute one of its citizens who obtains, or facilitates another citizen of 
the state in obtaining, an abortion in another state. The question is 
not whether an allegedly criminal act takes place within a state, but 
whether it takes place within the jurisdiction of the state. For resi-
dents of the state, the active personality principle alone would be suf-
ficient to justifY a state in applying its criminal law. 190 And, lest we 
forget, citizens of the United States are citizens of the state in which 
they reside .!91 
Lea Brilmayer has argued that when there is such a conf1ict, the 
law of the state where the act or event occurs must trump the law of 
the person's residency. 192 It is not clear if Brilmayer understands that 
in this context residency means citizenship, which arguably is a 
stronger contact than mere residence in a narrower sense 193-even 
though she herself has argued for a communitarian understanding of 
the authority of a state to apply its laws to members of its communi-
ty.194 There is, in fact, no premise in either international law 19s or in 
189. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,407-08 (1930); Gerling Global Reinsur-
ance Corp. of Am. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228, 1235-40 (ll th C:ir. 2001 ); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW§§ 2, 4 ( 1971 ); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 
19, at 147-55, 160-68; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 631-35; Reese, supm note 81, at 
1587-88; supra pp. 1664-73, 131. 
190. See supra pp. 1668-71. 
191. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ l. 
192. Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Ri._qht to Life, a1td the 
Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 880-89 (1993); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the 
Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, ISO U. PA. L. REV. 973, 975 (2002 ); 
Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra note 173, at 915; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, 
at 466. 
193. Brilmayer, supra note 192, at 877-80. 
194. Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. !, 9-!0 
(1991 ); see also Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra note 173, at 924-38 (similarly dismissing the 
obligation of a state's citizen to obey the state's law outside the state despite a recognition, in 
part, of a communitarian argument for obedience); Kreimer, The Law of Choice, sttfwa note 
173, at 506, 517 (arguing for the primacy of the national community over the local (state) 
community). This begs the question of whether a national community can exist regarding 
abortion policy if there are no national standards-as must be the case if states arc tree to have 
ditlerent abortion laws. But see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits o( Conmmuitv Self 
Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Countrv: A Liberal ] he my, 
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the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause or the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution to sup-
port an invariant preference for the territorial principle over the per-
sonality principlc. 1Y6 In fact, in one of the few (perhaps the only) ap-
parently hard and fast rules of choice of law that are constitutionally 
mandated, the "internal affairs rule" for corporate law, prefers the 
law of the "citizenship" of the corporation to the territorial prin-
ciple.I97 No wonder Walter Wheeler Cook, a founder of modern 
cont1icts theory, could write that "only a blind following of unsound 
territorial notions would lead to the conclusion" that the application 
of a state's criminal law extraterritorially would be unconstitution-
al.I<Jx 
i'l4 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1066-67 (1998) (arguing for more nuanced study of the limits of a 
communitv as a source of law within a larger community). 
195. There is a presumption in U.S. law against the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
l.m·, but tlut is all it is-a presumption. See, eif., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
24i'l ( 1991 ). Such a presumption docs not preclude the application of U.S. law cxtraterritorial-
lv whm the law was meant to apply extraterritorially. The decision in EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co. has been roundly criticized as a matter of American law. See, e.JJ., Larry Kramer, Vestiges 
of Beale-: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 Sur. Gr. REV. 179, 180-84, 
198-203. 
I '!6. Sec l'ac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-04 ( 1939) 
(approving application of the law of the place of the accident-the territorial principle-to a 
\nlrkers' compensation claim while expressly approving the Alaska Packers case); Alaska Pack-
ers Ass'n v. Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532,539-43 (1935) (approving application of the 
law of the residence of an injured worker when the injury occurred during seasonal employ-
ment in Alaska-the personality principle); Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of 
Formalimt, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735, 1792 ( 1988); Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 99, at 
8S'!; Rosen, ''Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 714-25. Brilmayer discussed the 
Alaska l'acker.r case, but she did not mention Pacific Employers; she did not consider this line of 
cases dispositive. Brilmayer, supra note 192, at 882-83; Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of 
£qual a ltd Territorial State.<: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 249, 257 ( 1992). See also Regan, supra note 78, for argument in favor of the priority of 
the territori.1l principle. Regan docs acknowledge the legitimacy of a state in regulating its citi-
zens who seck abortions out of the state. Id. at 1908-09,1912-13. 
I'!7. Sec supra p. 1675; ;·ee also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,70-
71 ( 1987) (upholding the application of Indiana's Control Share Acquisition law that is condi-
tioned on the residence of the stockholders); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 625 
(I '!82) (striking down Illinois' Business Takeover Act regulating hostile tender offers that 
would applv to a company with a connection to Illinois even if no shareholders resided in Illi-
nois) Sec _qmerally Regan, supra note 78, at 1876-80 (discussing the several opinions in Edgar 
P. MilE Corp). 
198. WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES Ol' THE CONfLICT OF 
LAWS 16 (I '!49). Kreimer cited this language and dismissed it in a f(>otnote, merely stating 
rh.n his disagreement with Cook "should not trouble us unduly" because Brainerd Currie also 
disagreed with Cook in some circumstances. Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 
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Brilmayer recognizes that for several states to have concurrent 
legislative jurisdiction is routine, but argues that this is impermissible 
in the criminal context because it would expose persons to the risk of 
uncertainty in the law applicable to their conduct and to double jeo-
pardy in that they could be prosecuted in more than one jurisdic-
tion.199 Yet the law accepts many situations when more than one 
body of criminal law applies to the same conduct/00 creating the very 
risks that Brilmayer believes the legal system cannot accept. Brilmay-
er ultimately offers no reason, other than the possibility of conflict-
ing laws being applicable to a single act in a single location to prefer 
the territorial principle except that she prefers it for abortion tour-
ism-apparently because it leads to the decision she prefers. 201 So 
weak is such an argument under choice of law theory that those, like 
Brilmayer, who seek to argue against state authority to apply its 
criminal law to its citizens who become abortion tourists have turned 
instead to other possible constitutional provisions (most often the 
right to travel) that normally have little or nothing to do with choice 
oflaw in an attempt to bar such an application of a state's law. 202 
The Supreme Court has embraced a constitutional right to tra-
vel.203 The right to travel to some extent derives from the Commerce 
Clause,204 but also more directly from the Privileges and Immunities 
484 n.105. But see Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2458-61 (analyzing Cook's work and its im-
portance in cont1icts theory). 
199. Brilmayer, supra note 194, at 884-86. 
200. Brilmayer acknowledges as much. Id. at 884 (citing Heath JJ. Alabamtl, 474 U.S. 82, 
87-93 ( 1985) ). Brilmayer seeks to distinguish cases involving two states each prosecuting t(Jr 
an act that is criminal in both states-which she sees as not problematic-from a stare prose-
cuting for an act that is not criminal in the state where the act was pcrt(mncd-which she sees 
as unconstitutional. 
201. She builds her argument on the assumption that the law of only one state could be 
applied, an assumption the correctness of which she simply does nor demonstrate. Sec id. at 
884-89. 
202. Brilmayer invokes the right to travel. !d. at 883; see also Kreimer, R(qht to TmJ>d, 
supra note 173, at 914; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, mpra note 173, at 456. 
203. Saenz v. Roc, 526 U.S. 489, 502-05 ( 1999) (denying wclt:u-c assistance to persons 
mcl\"ing !rom other states is barred bv a component of the right to travel); Edwards v. Calit(n·-
nia, 314 U.S. 160, 174 ( 1941) (striking down, under the Commerce Clause, a statute prohi-
biting the transportation of"paupcrs" into the state); see Bradt(,rd, supra note 173, at 158-65; 
Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 736-37. But see Evansville-Vandcrburgh 
Airport Auth'y Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 714 ( 1972) (holding that a t.1x on 
persons enplaning at an airport docs not violate the right to travel because it docs not discrimi-
nate between interstate and intrastate travel). 
204. U.S. Col': ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. On the link between the right to travel <llld the com-
merce clause, see Bradford, supra note 173, at 156; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, mpra note 
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Clause of Article 1V205 and the Fourteenth Amendment206 and the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 207 
Just how far a state can go in interfering with the right to travel is 
unclear. Impassioned assertions that to allow the law of the state of 
citizenship to apply its law to a citizen while traveling would impair 
the viability of the union of states at best beg the question of consti-
tutionality. 208 Sometimes the law of one's citizenship (residence) and 
the law of the location of an act or event will both be applicable. 209 
That is simply one consequence of living in a federal, rather than a 
unitary, legal system. 
The Supreme Court decisions do not resolve the question of the 
limits imposed on the application of state law by the right to travel. 
In Jones v. Helms, 210 the Supreme Court upheld, against a challenge 
based on the right to travel, a statute making a person who abandons 
a dependent child guilty of a felony if the person leaves the state, but 
only a misdemeanor if the person remains within the state. The 
Court indicated that at the least a state could prohibit travel for a 
173, at 488-97; Regan, supra note 78, at 1888-89; Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra 
note 99, at 736-38. 
205. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2; see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764-67 (1966) 
(Harlan,]., with Warren, C.]., & Douglas & Brennan, J]., dissenting); .<ee also Brilmayer, .rupra 
note 192, at 881-83; .<ee also Kreimer, Right to TraPel, supra note 173, at 914-15, 917-18; 
Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 464-68, 497-519; Metzger, supra note 7, at 
1529-31, 1538-41; Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" l'lurali.rm?, supra note 99, at 732-37. But see 
Regan, supra note 78, at 1889 (arguing that the Privilege and Immunities Clause does not 
impact right to travel f(x residents). 
206. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1; see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,97 (1908), 
oPerruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (listing the right to pass 
freely from state to state as among the privileges of national citizenship); .<ee al.<o Kreimer, Right 
to Travel, .rupra note 173, at 915, 920; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 504-
06; Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 737-40. 
207. U.S. CONST. amends. V; XIV,§ I. 
208. This is the line of argument developed by Seth Kreimer. Kreimer, Right to Travel, 
supra note 173, at 914-24. The argument is refuted in Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 
99, at 933-45; and Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 744-59. 
209. Examples arc innumerable. See, eg., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82,92-93 (1985) 
(upholding a conviction in Alabama under Alabama law for kidnapping and murder when the 
kidnapping was in Alabama but the murder was in Georgia; the Court indicated that the de-
fendant could also have been convicted in Georgia under Georgia law). See lreneralZy Rosen, 
Extraterritoriality, supra note 99, at 946-63. 
210. 452 U.S. 412 (1981); see Bradford, .<upra note 173, at 159-60. 
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criminal purpose so long as the restriction on travel is rationally re-
lated to the crime. 211 This would seem to cover abortion tourism. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Zablocki v. RedhaiP 12 
struck down the extraterritorial enforcement of a state statute prohi-
biting remarriage if a person was not current with child support obli-
gations ordered by a court in that state. The court based its conclu-
sion, however, on a finding that the right to marry (not the right to 
travel213 ) was "of fundamental importance" as an aspect of the right 
to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment. 214 Even with that 
holding, however, the Court was careful to indicate that not every 
regulation of marriage would be subject to a strict scrutiny standard 
of review.215 Today, the right to an abortion is not a fundamental 
right. 216 It seems unlikely that a future Supreme Court that would 
loosen Roe v. Wade sufficiently to give rise to such a conflict would 
find that the right to travel prevents a state from enforcing its laws 
against its citizens. 217 
The Supreme Court has, on at least two occasions, addressed the 
right to travel in the context of abortion. In Doe v. Bolton/ 1R the ma-
jority struck down, as an impairment of the right to travel, the sec-
tion of a statute that mandated abortions only be perf(xmed on resi-
dents of the state. This provision amounted to discrimination against 
non-residents of the state in accessing medical services in the state/ 1 ~ 
while a prohibition of a resident obtaining an abortion in another 
state does not work any such discrimination. Doe also arose at a time 
when the right to an abortion was held to be a fundamental right. 220 
Arguably, the import of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, in substituting an undue burden standard for the 
211. ]one,·, 452 U.S. at 421-23; seel:rcnerally Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, mpm 
note 99, at 741-43. 
212. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
213. This is a distinction that Bradford missed. Bradford, supra note 173, at 15X (discuss 
ing the right to travel, but not mentioning the right to marry). 
214. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384. 
215. !d. at 386. Scelrenerallv Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 742-
44. 
216. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. X33, 874-79 (1992). 
217. Sa fallon, supra note 184, at 638-40 (discussing the potential impact of the right 
to travel on abortion laws). 
218. 410 U.S. 179,200 (1973). 
219. lkldf(mi,mpranote 173,at 163. 
220. Id. 
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former strict scrutiny, is to indicate that abortion is not a fundamen-
tal right. 221 That position was taken explicitly in the concurring and 
dissenting opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist. 222 If 
the right to abortion is still a fundamental right, a state can hardly 
argue that it has a compelling interest in preventing non-residents 
from obtaining an abortion that it allows to residents, but it might 
have a compelling interest in protecting fetuses within the state from 
abortions wherever they occur. 223 The closest we come to a case on 
point is Bray v. Alexandria Women)s Health Clinic,224 in which a ma-
jority of the Court declined to t1nd a violation of the right to travel 
when the purpose of the interference was to prevent abortions and 
not to interfere with travel as such. Justice John Paul Stevens, in dis-
sent, asserted that a woman's right to travel to obtain an abortion is 
protected by the Constitution, but only Justice Harry Blackmun 
joined this opinion. 225 
Apart from the right to travel, the Commerce Clause itself could 
have an ctlect on the application of abortion statutes to acts in 
another state. The so-called dormant commerce clause will bar the 
application of state laws that discriminate against or improperly bur-
den interstate commerce. 226 A prohibition of a state's citizens obtain-
ing an abortion regardless of where it occurs is not likely to be held 
to discriminate against interstate commerce.227 If an abortion statute 
221. l'lrmncd l'atntthood, 505 U.S. at 833, 874-87, 895, 901 (plurality opinion per 
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, J).), 920-22 (Stevens,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
222. Id. at 950-54, 964 (Rchnquist, C.]., with Scalia, Thomas, & White,]}., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
223. But see Virginia v. Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809,811-12,824 (1975) (stating that a state 
could not prevent its residents !rom traveling to another state to obtain an abortion in a case 
striking down a statute prohibiting the advertising of out-ofstatc abortions). Most scholars 
have concluded that the statement in Bicrre!ow is dictum. Seecrrenerally Brad!ilrd, supra note 173, 
at 163-65; Fallon, supra note 184, at 629; Regan, supra note 78, at 1907-08; Rosen, Extra-
territoriality, supm note 99, at 891, 969-72; Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 
99, .1t 723-25. Contra Kreimer, 1he Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 459 n.27. On a state's 
interest in preventing abortions, sec l'ltmned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 833, 869-79 (plurality 
opinion per O'Connor, Kcnncdv, & Souter, Jj.); and Webster J'. Reproductive Health SerJ!s., 
492 U.S. 490, 51 Y ( 198Y) (plurality opinion per Rehnquist, C.J., with White & Kennedy, JJ.). 
224. 506 U.S. 263,274-78 ( 1993). 
225. ld. at 332 (Stevens,}., with Blackmun, }., dissenting). 
226. United Haulers Ass'n, v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 
1786, 17Y2-93 (2007). Sct'lfnterallv jack L. l;oldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, 1he Internet and the 
normant Commerce Clarm, II 0 YALE L.}. 785 (2001 ). 
227. Bradt(Jrd, supra note 173, at 156-57; Fallon, supra note 184, at 636-38; Rosen, 
"Hard" or "Sof't" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 726-30. 
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does not discriminate against interstate commerce, it will be upheld 
as a statute directed at legitimate local concerns so long as the bene-
fits to the state's interests clearly outweigh the incidental effects the 
statute might have on interstate commercc. 22x Special weight is given 
to state regulations when the regulations are designed to protect the 
health or safety of its citizens. 229 
As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote on behalf of a majority of 
the Supreme Court in 2007, the Commerce Clause "is not a roving 
license for federal courts to decide what activities arc appropriate f()r 
state and local governments to undertake, and what activities must 
be the province of private market competition. " 230 Substitute "per-
sonal choice" for the phrase "private market competition," and there 
seems to be little problem with a state applying its abortion laws to 
its own citizens under the Commerce Clause. 231 The Commerce 
Clause by itself might preclude the application of a state's abortion 
statute to non-residents who do no act within the state. 232 Just how 
far this last limitation extends is not clear,m but combine it with the 
holding in Nielsen234 (old as it is), and the conclusion that a state 
cannot apply its abortion statute to a person who performs or f:Kili-
228. United Haulers A.1s'n, 127 S. Ct. at 1797 (Roberts, C.)., with Souter, Ginsberg, & 
Beyer, ]].,concurring in ftdl; Thomas,)., concurring in the judgment) (citing Pike\'. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)); ,·ec also Nw. Cent. Pipeline Co. v. State Corp. 
Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 525-26 ( 1989); City of Philadelphia\'. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617,624 (1978). SeelJmerallv Ikllia, supra note lX4, at 775-76; Bradt(m!, .wpm note 173, at 
148-57; Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" l'luralisml, supra note 99, at 727-30. for an extended <1r-
gument against balancing, sec Regan, supra note 78, at 1866-68. 
229. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 ( 1982 ); Citv of l'hlladcl-
phia, 437 U.S. at 623-24. 
230. United Haulers A,:r'n, 127 S. Ct. at 1796. 
231. Bradt(m!, supra note 173, at 149-53; cf Riis v. Commonwealth, 41X S.W.2d 396, 
397-98 (Ky. 1967) (upholding, against a commerce clause challenge, a statute prohibiting 
transporting a person out of state against her will). 
232. See Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 492-94; Rosen, E.-.::tmtaritoriali-
ty, supra note 99, at 919-30; Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" l'lttrali.rml, supra note 99, at 726-27; 
cf Quill Corp. \'. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310-11 ( 1992) (barring <1 st.1te ti·om imposing 
a tax on an out-ofstate vendor who docs nothing within the state except send products 
through the mail); Hcalv \'. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 ( 1989) (striking down,\ 
statute that applied to pricing outside the state's border). Whether Congress could authorize 
such state regulation of out-ot~state conduct is another question. Sa Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft'' 
Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 727. 
233. See ;Jenerallv BradtC:mi, suprtl note 170, at 153-57; Kreimer, DJC Law of C!Joicc, su-
pra note 173, at 488-97. 
234. Sec supra pp. 1685-86. 
1692 
1651] Abortion Across State Lines 
tates an abortion outside the state while performing no act within 
the state becomes pretty firm. 23s 
In searching f(Jr a constitutional basis for denying the legislative 
jurisdiction of the state of citizenship, Steven Bradford has even ar-
gued that states cannot charge someone with a crime committed 
within another state because it would be impossible to empanel a 
jury drawn from the vicinage of the crime.236 That might be true in 
states that have embedded a right to a jury from the vicinage in their 
constitutions.m For those states, the question is how strictly they 
will construe the definition of the crime being prosecuted.238 After 
all, while the U.S. Constitution requires a jury of the vicinage,239 it 
also expressly provides for the trial of federal crimes occurring out-
side of any state240-dfectively, outside the United States. Moreover, 
every court but one that has considered the question has concluded 
235. Thi' is the point that Brilmayer seeks to make the basis of her argument that the 
territorial state must always prevail in a conflict with the laws of the state of residence. Brilmay-
er, supra note 192, at ~~9-903. She goes too tar in seeking to apply it in contexts where the 
state has not aftirmativdv licensed the conduct in question. See tllso Appleton, supra note 37, at 
673. 
236. Sec Bradt<mi, supra note 173, at 137-47; su also Kreimer, Right to TraPel, supra 
note 173, clt 921--24 (arguing f(>r the application of strictly territorial jurisdiction over criminal 
matters based on various grounds related to the need to try the case where it arose); Kreimer, 
'17;c Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 466 (citing the local jury requirement as a limitation on 
state criminal jurisdiction). Gerald Neuman, however, has expressed considerable skepticism 
.1bout the relevance of the vicinage principle. Neuman, supra note 177, at 941. 
237. According to Bradt(>rd, at least fourteen states have no such provision. Bradford, 
Jupm note 173, clt 141. The states that Bradt()rd lists arc Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Ida-
ho, Iowa, Michig.m, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode 
Island, Texas, and West Virginia. Id. 
238. Depending on how the crime is defined, usually at least part of the crime will have 
occurred in the state, and thus there in bet might be no problem under the vicinage require-
ment. Cf Heath \'.Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 94 ( 1985) (upholding a conviction in Alabama un-
der Alabama law f(>r kidnapping and murder when the kidnapping was in Alabama but the 
murder was in lieorgia); United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405,408-09 (1958) (holding that 
.111 alien charged with m·crstaving his landing permit committed the crime in each district in 
which he staved after his permit expired). A few lower court cases have found that venue lies in 
the district \\·ith the more substantial contacts, but this is not a holding that only the most in-
terested district ha' jurisdiction. See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 
1987); United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986). Bradford disregards 
the limited import of these decisions. Bradf(n·d, mpra note 173, at 146-47. 
239. U.S. Co;-.;sr. amend. VI. 
240. !d. art. Ill,§ 2. 
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that the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury of the vicinage 
docs not apply to the states. 241 
The possibility of a state applying its law to an abortion tourist or 
to a resident who facilitates the efforts of an abortion tourist can easi-
ly be evaded by simply taking up residence in the state where the 
abortion is sought.242 This, of course, is not as easy as it sounds. Such 
a change of residence could be challenged in the state of prior resi-
dence as a sham, leaving the defendant exposed to the risk of convic-
tion there. 243 Thus, while a change of residence can be instantane-
ous/44 to make certain that it will not be held to be a sham, any 
purported change of residence will require living there for some time 
and at least going through the motions of starting a new lite there-
establishing an address, looking for or taking a job, enrolling in 
school, securing a new driver's license, etc. Such things are possible, 
of course, but they will raise the price beyond the means of many, or 
perhaps most, women who would like to be an abortion tourist. 24" 
And even for women who could afford to do so, it would be a signif-
icant burden.246 
241. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345 (6th Cir. 1988 ); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F2d 
593, 595 (5th Cir. 1986); Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); 
Trindlc v. State, 602 A.2d 1232, 1238-39 (Md. 1992) (Eldridge,)., dissenting in part) (over· 
turned on other grounds); Commonwealth v. Duteau, 424 N.E.2d 1119, 1126 (Mass. 1981) 
(dictum); State v. Darroch, 287 S.E.2d 856,859-60 (N.C. 1982); State v. Benke, 526 N.E.2d 
274, 288 (Ohio 1988 ); State v. Paiz, 817 S.W.2d 84, 85-86 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1991 ); sec 
fallon, supra note 184, at 635-36. Contra Miss. Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So.2d 
1163, 1165 (Miss. 1987). 
242. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302-03 (1942); see Fallon, mpra note 
184, at 639-40; Regan, supra note 78, at 1909. 
243. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,239 (1945) (upholding a conviction for 
bigamy after the state court t(mnd that the purported Nevada residence was a sham). 
244. A change of residence (or domicile) occurs when physical presence is combined with 
the intent to make the place one's home. Sec, e,_q., In re Jones' Estate, 182 N.W. 227, 234 
(Iowa 1921); White v. Tennant, 8 S.E. 596,597 (W.Va. 18ll8). 
245. Brilmayer, supra note 192, at ll79. On the efrects of costs on the ability of women 
to obtain abortions, see Carol )otle, Physician Provision ofAbortion before Roc v. Wade, 9 RES. 
Soc. HEALTH CARE 21, 28-30 ( 1991 ); and Steven Polgar & Ellen S. Fried, The Bad Old Days: 
Clandestine Abortions Among the Poor in New York City BejiJre Liberalization of the Abortion 
Law, ll FAM. !'LAN. PERSP. 125, 126 (1976 ). 
246. The burden might be so significant as to be an "undue burden." Gonz.1lcs v. Car· 
hart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626-27 (2007). 
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B. Civil Conflicts 
Apart from possible criminal prosecutions regarding out-of-state 
abortions, significant civil litigation concerning abortion could arise 
if the Supreme Court continues to loosen its standards regarding the 
permissible scope for different state laws. Civil litigation could in-
volve suits for an injunction against an abortion or the appointment 
of a guardian for the fetus to approve or prevent an abortion. Or 
someone who has undergone an abortion could later seek to recover 
for injuries for malpractice in the performance of the abortion. Each 
of these suits would require its own distinct analysis under choice of 
law theory. 
Injunctions could be sought either by a public officer or by an 
interested private person. Perhaps the best-known example of such 
an injunction is Attorney General v. X/47 a case brought in Ireland to 
enjoin an adolescent girl from going to England for an abortion. 
Such a suit, although technically on the civil side of a court docket, 
really is a matter of public law and implicates the same policy con-
cerns that arise in criminallitigation.248 A suit by the father or other 
relative of the fetus to enjoin an abortion/49 however, is a form of 
private litigation and the applicable law would be determined by the 
usual choice of law approaches applicable to civil litigation. 
Injunctions or other equitable relief depend entirely on personal 
jurisdiction over the person (natural or artificial) subject to the court 
247. [1992] 1 I.R. 1; see lJCnerally THE ATTORNEY GENERAL V. X AND OTHERS: 
JUDGMENTS OF THE HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT WITH SUBMISSIONS MADE BY 
COUNSEL TO THE SUPREME COURT (S. McDonaugh ed. 1992); Marie Fox & Therese Mur-
phy, Irish Abortion: SeckinlJ Refulfe in a jurisprudence of Doubt and DelelJation, 19 J. LAW & 
Soc'Y 454, 455 ( 1992 ); Ailbhe Smyth, The "X" Case: Women and Abortion in the Republic of 
lrelmtd, 1992, 1 l'EMINIST LEGAL STUD. 163 ( 1993); Paul Ward, Ireland: Abortion: "X"+ "Y" 
~ ?1, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. l'AM. L. 385 ( 1995 ). 
248. See Bradf(mi, mpra note 173, at 92-95; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 
173, at 457-58. 
249. Such suits thus E1r have been rejected by courts. See, Clf., Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 
1308, !308-09 (1988); Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), ajJ'd 
mon., 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. !988); see also Robin Powers Morris, Note, 1he Comeau Case, 
FurtherinlJ the Trends of Fetal Ri._qhts and Religious Freedom, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONfiNEMENT 89, 91-98 (discussing a case in which a woman was kept in custody in a 
hospital because she declined to have medical assistance with her pregnancy because of her 
religious views). 
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order. 250 Even the restrictive view of personal jurisdiction in Penn oyer 
v. Nejf51 allowed a court exercising equitable powers to order a per-
son subject to the court's jurisdiction to do or to retrain from doing 
something in another jurisdiction. Thus, so long as the abortion 
tourist or someone aiding the abortion tourist is still within the state, 
a court could order the person not to leave the state and not to have, 
or facilitate, an abortion in another state so long as the law of the f{1-
rum would allow such an order. Generally speaking, the person sub-
ject to the order from a state court could leave the state and ignore 
the order, for generally such orders will not be recognized or en-
forced in another state. 252 If one can obtain the injunction from a 
federal court, the evasion problem is largely avoided because federal 
court injunctions have nationwide eHect, even if the injunction is is-
sued based upon state law grounds. 253 The person subject to the or-
der could not return to the state without being subject to punish-
ment for contempt of court. 254 
Suits for damages could arise in highly varied circumstances, 
many of which would run contrary to the policy of a state with a dif-
ferent approach to abortion than the state in which the suit is 
brought. A father or other relative could seck damages from the 
mother, the abortionist, or anyone who facilitated the abortion. 255 A 
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Ol' CONFLICT Of LAWS§ 53 ( 1971 ). SeejjCIJeml!v DA~ ll. 
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES§ 1.3 (abridged ed. I 993); SCOLES ET AL., .wpm note 19, at !!55-
59; Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 7 4 7 ( I 998). 
251. 95 U.S. 714,723 (1877). 
252. State court equitable orders are not entitled to tldl faith and credit in another state, 
if only because the orders are modillablc in the state where thev originated. See, e.g., fall v. 
Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1909); Meenach v. Gen. Motors Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398,401 (Ky. 
1995 ). The majority in Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234, 239 (l 998 ), de-
clared in dictum that equitable decrees were entitled to full faith and credit between the actual 
parties to the litigation in which the decree was entered, but did not require the court in 
another state to enforce the injunction when important interests in that other state would be 
impaired. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 1156; Price, supra note 250, at 761-81, 791-
92; Kaleen S. Hasegawa, Note, Re-Evaluating the Limits of the Ft.tll Faith and Credit ClauJ"C 
after Baker v. General Motors Corporation, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 747, 754-60 ( 1999). 
253. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods. Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) (trade-
mark dilution claims); see generally Price, supra note 250, at 786-91 (same). Contra Ciba-
Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 747 F.2d 844, 854 n.6 (3d Cir. 1984). Such orders could 
still be evaded by departing for another countty. 
254. Burt v. Dodge, 599 N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ohio 1992 ); see DOBBS, supra note 250, §§ 
1.1 at 5, 1.4 at 13-14. 
255. Cf Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308 (1988) (rejecting a father's suit to enjoin an 
abortion); see also Mo. REV. STAT.§ 188.250 (Supp. 2007) (authorizing the parents to rccm'cr 
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pro-lite or pro-choice actiVISt could sue for defamation by someone 
on the other side of the abortion controversy.256 A child born with 
injuries from an unsuccessful abortion could sue the abortionist or 
others involved in the attempt. 207 Perhaps less policy diversity would 
confi·ont suits where a woman who underwent an abortion was in-
jured through malpractice by the abortionist. 258 In delineating the 
types of suits possible, imagination is the only limit. 
In contrast to the uncertain enfc>rceability of an equitable order, 
a judgment tor money damages must be enforced in every state un-
der the htll faith and Credit Clause. m The conflicts problems arise 
only bef(xe a judgment is entered-when the court chooses the law 
to be applied in the litigation. That in turn depends upon which of 
the three different approaches to choice oflaw the court tollows. 260 
The vested rights approach would generally preclude a damages 
award against persons involved in abortion tourism. The court would 
have to characterize the claim according to whether it was one for 
tort, contract, property, or status, but generally for any of these cha-
racterizations, the court would apply the law of the place where the 
d~lllLlgcs .1gain~t any person who C.Hiscs, aids, or assists a n1inor in obtaining an out-of-state 
.1bortion ). 
256. Sec, CJf., Horsley v. !'ddt, 12X I'. Supp. 2d 1374, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2000); tf Apple-
ton, supra note 37, clt 6XO-X I (discussing tree speech concerns in attempts to ban advertising 
h>r out-of-sure abortions); 1-'allon, supmnote IR4, at 641--46 (same). 
257. Stc, C.jJ., Cherry v. Horsman, 75 D.L.R.4th 66R (B.C. S. Ct. 1991); .ree also 
DE!.L\.PEN:O.:A, supra note 15, at 66X. 
25X. Sec, e.._q., Gaydar v. Sociedad lnstiruto Gineco-Quirurigico, 345 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st 
Cir. 2003 ); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en bane); Perguson v. Tam is, 
937 P 2d 347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996 ); Vuitch v. 1-'urr, 482 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1984); Atlanta Ob-
stetrics v. Coleman, 39R S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1990); Adams v. Family Planning Assocs. Med. 
Group, 733 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Collins v. Thakkar, 552 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1990); Kiddy v. Lipscomb, 628 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1993); Eidson v. Reproductive 
Health Sen·s., R63 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993 ); Blackburn v. Blue Mt. Women's Clinic, 
951 P.2d I (Mont. 1997); Ferrara v. Bernstein, 613 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1993); Phillips v. Tri-
angle W<>mcn's Health Clinic, 573 S.E.2d 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Davis v. Fieker, 952 
l'.2d 505 (Okla. 1997); Hunte v. Hinkley, 731 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Lake v. N. 
Va. Women's Med. Ctr., 483 S.E.2d 220 (Va. 1997); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (Supp. IV 
2004) (authorizing suit f(>r damages on behalf of the father or, under some circumstances, of 
the maternal grandparents t()r the loss of a child through a partial-birth abortion; the statute 
does not indicate whether the suit is to be against the mother, the abortionist, or both). 
259. U.S. Co:o.:sT. art. IV,§ 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); JU SCOLES ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 1159-R7; WFI!\TRAUB, supra note 19, at 737-46; William L. Reynolds, The Iron 
LaJP of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412, 412-13 ( 1994) ("This basic rule is so clear 
and so strong that it might be called the 'Iron Law' of full Faith and Credit."). 
260. See supra pp. 1658-64. 
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abortion took place. 201 A court in the resident state of the abortion 
tourist might decline to follow the law of the place of the abortion 
on grounds that to do so would violate public policy/62 but that 
would not allow the state to substitute its own law in the suit-at 
least in the classic formulation of the public policy rulc. 263 Other es-
cape devices are no more likely to be effective. 
Courts adhering to one or another form of interest analysis have 
more possibilities open to them. Courts would have to analyze the 
policies involved in the competing laws and determine whether there 
is no conflict, a false conflict, or a true conflict.264 If there is no con-
flict or a false conflict, the resolution of the choice of law problem is 
easy. 265 For true conflicts, the court would select one or another of 
the proffered bases for resolving true conflicts. 266 
The resident state of the abortion tourist has an interest in pro-
tecting and regulating its citizen267 and also in fostering respect for 
life in the form of unborn children located, at least for a time, within 
its borders. 268 Similarly, the state where the abortion takes place has 
261. Defamation suits would be more ditlicult to localize. See, e.._q., Ettore v. l'hilco Tele-
vision Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 483-85 (3d Cir. 1956); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 
N.Y.S.2d 361, 354-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 01' TORTS§ 
577A reporter's note (1977); SCOLES ET AL., mpra note 19, at 802-03; WE!NTRi\UB, supra 
note 19, at 457-61; Albert E. Ehrenzwcig, The Place of ActinJr in Intentional Multistate Torts: 
Law and Reason versus the Restatement, 36 MrNN. L. REV. 1, 33-35 ( 1951 ). 
262. See, eg., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198,202 (1918) ("[Courts] do not 
close their doors, unless help would violate some timdamental principle of justice, some preva-
lent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."); sec also 
SCOLES ET AL., mpra note 19, at 139-41; WE!NTRAUB, supra note 19, at 106-12. 
263. See, eLq., Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gcsdlschaft, 14 N.E.2d 798, 799-800 
(N.Y. 1938) (disallowing public policy as a basis f(x applying the forum's law when nothing 
connected with the case occurred within the forum state). But sec Pearson v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 
309 f.2d 553,560-61 (2nd Cir. 1962); Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526,527-
29 (N.Y. 1961 ). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 140; WE!NTRAUB, supra note 
19, at 100-01, 109-ll, 683-84. 
264. Sec .rup1·a p. 1661. 
265. Sec, e.._q., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279,284-85 (N.Y. 1963). 
266. See supra p. 1661. I leave aside the question of whether "the unprovided t(lr case" 
should be treated the same way as a blse conflict or a true conflict. 
267. See Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" l'luralisnz1, mpra note 99, at 718-25; cf Tooker v. Lo-
pez, 249 N.E.2d 394,399-403 (N.Y. 1969) (applying New York law to an accident in Michi-
gan involving a New York domiciliary riding in a vehicle registered in New York and dri,-cn bv 
another New York domiciliary). This interest exists even it~ as Susan Appleton argues, abortion 
is about entllrcing gender roles rather than about protecting fetuses. Appleton, supm note 37, 
at 660-67. 
268. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2007); Jec also Morris, supra note 249, 
at 99-100. 
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an interest in regulating or allowing abortions and in protecting per-
sons who seek or provide abortions within its borders. 269 So long as 
the abortion statutes can be fairly construed as expressing policies 
that promote these interests,270 the resulting conflict will be a true 
conflict-even in suits against persons who did no relevant act within 
the jurisdiction of the particular state. 271 However a court resolves 
these often-contentious questions, the marked bias in favor of apply-
ing forum law272 probably means that each court would apply its own 
law and the plaintifl could dlectively pick the law by picking the fo-
rum. This conclusion might be diflerent, however, if the defendant 
were, f()r example, a student from a pro-life state who has been stud-
ying for several years in a pro-choice state, and who became pregnant 
and had the abortion there even while retaining a technical domicile 
in the pro-life state. 273 
Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer have argued that all courts 
must choose the law most favorable to freedom of choice for abor-
tion.274 While a court might reach that conclusion, particularly a 
court in a state whose policy favors freedom of choice, their view is 
too optimistic if suit is brought in a state that disfavors freedom of 
choice. Brilmayer (a conflicts scholar) at least sought to develop 
some sort of interest analysis to support her conclusion.275 As Gerald 
Neuman noted, a view such as Brilmayer's "gives excessive attention 
to the power of territorial states based on the location of particular 
acts while neglecting the jurisdictional implications of the relation-
ships among those involved in the acts. " 276 Kreimer (who repeatedly 
269. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (summary reversal without argu-
ment of an injunction against enforcement of Montana's requirement that abortions be per-
tim11ed by a licensed physician); Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 
2000) (upholding state regulations of abortion clinics); see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, 
at 716. 
270. Sec, CJJ., Appleton, supra note 37, at 678-82. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, 
LcgislatiPc Arr1~qance tmd Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. RF.v. 753 (2006 ). 
271. Cf Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438,443-47 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying New York 
law against a Massachusetts physician who did no relevant act in New York). This leaves aside 
the question of whether the court can obtain personal jurisdiction over the person who did no 
relcYant act within the state. 
272. Sec supra pp. 1661. 
273. This possibility was tirst pointed out by Professor Neuman. Neuman, supra note 
177, at 942. 
274. Brilmaycr, supra note 194, at 897-903; Kreimer, Ri,_qht to Travel, supra note 173, at 
913-24; Kreimer, 'l7;e Lall' of Choice, supra note 173. 
275. Brilmayer, supra note 194, at 897-903. 
276. Neuman, . .-upra note 177, at 950-51. 
1699 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
noted that he is not a conflicts scholar) simply asserted that the in-
terest analysis cases "acknowledge the power of the law of the place 
where primary conduct occurs to determine its basic permissibility or 
wrongfulness. " 277 Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Neoterritorialism puts greater emphasis on the place where the 
conduct in question occurred, but not absolutely so. 278 Where the 
parties share the same domicile and the basis of the suit implicates 
compensatory policies rather than admonitory rules, the court will 
apply the law of the common domicile. 279 For most of the possible 
suits arising out of abortions, courts are likely to conclude that the 
rules are admonitory/80 but one can hardly be certain. 
Finally, the constitutional limitations on choice of law are simply 
not likely to affect a court's decision in these matters. 281 Unless the 
court chooses the law of a state without substantial contact with the 
parties or the acts or events, the constitutional limitations simply 
have no role to play.282 Both the state that is the location of the act 
in question283 and the state that is the residence of one or more of 
the persons involved in the litigation have a substantial connection 
with the litigation.284 Thus a court would be justified, even as against 
non-residents, in applying its own law to resolve a suit for damag-
es.285 Even if a court were to choose to apply a law unrelated to the 
parties, the act, or the forum, the choice can only be challenged on 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and not 
277. Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 482. He developed his analysis at 
length in id. at 472-87. 
278. See supra pp. 1663-64. 
279. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679,685-87 (N.Y. 1985); first 
Nat'! Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 319 (Colo. 1973); see supra p. 1663-64. 
280. See Cross, supra note 75 (discussing how courts determine whether a law is admoni· 
tory-conduct regulating). 
281. See supra pp. 1673-82. 
282. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 735 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,818 (1985). 
283. Watson v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71-73 (1954); P.V. ex 
rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 922 A.2d 761, 765-66 (N.J. App. Div. 2007), cert. granted, 927 
A.2d 1293 (N.J. 2007). 
284. Cf Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408,412-14 (1955); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. In-
dus. Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,497-501 (1939). See generally Appleton, supra note 37, at 
671-72; Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 99, at 871-76. 
285. Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 718-25. 
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collaterally attacked m resisting enforcement of the judgment in 
another state. 286 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To the extent that the Supreme Court backs off from being the 
supreme medical review board for abortion policy and allows states 
to enact divergent statutes regulating, restricting, or perhaps even 
prohibiting abortion, conflicts between state laws are bound to arise. 
So long as some states have less restrictive laws than other states, 
there will be women willing and able to become abortion tour-
ists287 -and even in the unlikely event that all states in the United 
States were to prohibit abortion, there will be abortion tourists 
going to other countries. 288 The resulting conflicts of law will f(xus 
primarily on efforts to apply the law of the state of her residence to 
the abortion tourist or, more likely, to a person who facilitates the 
abortion tourist in obtaining an abortion given the unlikelihood that 
states will treat a woman who obtains an abortion as a crimina\. 289 
While the matter is not entirely tree from doubt, the state of the 
abortion tourist's residence most likely will be able to apply its crimi-
nal law even though the abortion is legal in the state where it is per-
f(mned.2<J0 The resident state of the abortion tourist cannot apply its 
criminal law to persons who reside outside the state for actions lawful 
at the place of performance.291 Furthermore, the resident state of the 
abortion tourist may apply its civil law even to residents of other 
states.m On the other hand, the persons who might be subjected to 
an abortion law that they are seeking to escape from can do so by es-
tablishing a new residence at the place where they obtain the abor-
tion-even if they resume their former residence subsequent to the 
abortion. 293 If these conclusions are correct, legislators in states that 
286. Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 77-78 (1939); see SCOLES ET AL., 
supra note 19, at 1143-46; WEI>;TRAU!l, supra note 19, at 741--46. 
287. See DELLAPE:--;NA, supra note 15, at 572-73, 585, 596--97, 624, 626, 710, 725. 
288. One of the major incidents that fueled the abortion reform movement was the well-
publicized trip of Sherri Finkbine-the "teacher" on a then well-known television program 
directed at pre-school children called "Romper Room"--to Sweden to obtain an abortion of a 
thalidomide baby. Id. at 596-97. 
289. See id. at 240-41, 299-302, 327, 544-45. 
290. See supra pp. 1682-94. 
291. See supra pp. 1683-84. 
292. See supra pp. 1695-1701. 
293. See supra p. 1694. 
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seek to restrict access to abortion should consider carefully whether 
to extend its laws extraterritorially to activities involving its residents. 
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